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This thesis uses systems engineering principles and an evolutionary process 
model to develop a parts harvesting procedure for the Mine Countermeasure (MCM-1) 
class ships. This procedure will facilitate harvesting required components from a 
decommissioning MCM-1 class ship that will be refurbished for reuse on the remaining 
in-service ships. These harvested components are critical to ensuring MCM-1 ships can 
conduct mine countermeasure operations by having required repair parts to keep the 
systems functioning as designed. Additionally, the harvested components will help the 
ship class meet expected service life. Parts harvesting is required to keep the ships 
operational due to various system(s)’ single point failure design, installed equipment 
material low-permeability requirements, and limited overall part demand for the mine 
countermeasure unique systems. The parts harvesting process developed is executable, 
cost-effective and critical to ensuring the MCM-1 class ships are materially able to 
operate as designed. Various systems engineering tools are utilized in the parts harvesting 
procedure to assess the ship as an overall system, determine critical components, 
establish sparing requirements, and minimize cost for repair parts. The procedure 
includes identification of components to harvest, funding and execution of harvesting 
operations, warehousing, refurbishment of harvested components, disposal, and 
measuring procedure effectiveness. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................1 
B.  BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
1.  Mine Warfare History ...................................................................2 
2.  Mine Warfare Threat ....................................................................7 
a.  Bottom Mines ......................................................................9 
b.  Buoyant Moored Mines ....................................................10 
c.  Drifting Mines ...................................................................11 
d.  Limpet Mines .....................................................................12 
3.  Mine Warfare Importance ..........................................................13 
C.  BENEFITS OF STUDY ...........................................................................17 
II.  RESEARCH: MINE WARFARE CAPACITY—TODAY AND 
TOMORROW ......................................................................................................19 
A.  MCM-1 CLASS SHIPS’ EXPECTED SERVICE LIFE ......................19 
B.  READINESS KILL CHAIN/SURFACE MASTER 
PLAN/CLASS EXECUTION PLANS AND MINE WARFARE 
TRANSITION FROM MINE COUNTERMEASURE TO 
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP MINE WARFARE MISSION 
PACKAGE................................................................................................21 
C.  CURRENT FUNDING ENVIRONMENT (CONSTRAINTS) 
AND IMPACTS TO MIW ......................................................................23 
III.  PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................................25 
A.  STATEMENT OF PROBLEM ...............................................................25 
B.  WHAT IS PARTS HARVESTING? ......................................................25 
C.  FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION .....................................................26 
D.  MCM-1 CLASS MATERIAL CHALLENGES ....................................31 
E.  SHIP DESIGN SINGLE POINT FAILURE CHALLENGES ............32 
F.  OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT .......................32 
G.  HARVESTING IMPORTANCE ............................................................33 
IV.  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ..........................................................................39 
A.  SYSTEM PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND .......................................39 
B.  LOCATION ..............................................................................................40 
C.  ATTRIBUTES ..........................................................................................41 
D.  PERFORMANCES AND UTILIZATIONS ..........................................41 
E.  LIFE CYCLE OF PROBLEM ...............................................................41 
 viii
F.  LIFE CYCLE OF NEED.........................................................................42 
G.  ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ...............................................42 
H.  TIMEFRAME ..........................................................................................43 
I.  SYSTEM BOUNDARIES .......................................................................48 
J.  STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ...............................................................48 
1.  Department of Transportation—Maritime 
Administration .............................................................................51 
2.  Department of Homeland Security—U.S. Coast Guard ..........51 
3.  Department of Defense—Mine Countermeasure 
Squadrons (MCMRONs) 3, 5, and 7 ..........................................51 
4.  Maintenance Team.......................................................................52 
5.  Port Engineer ...............................................................................52 
6.  RMC Project Manager ................................................................52 
7.  In-Service MCM Ship Crews ......................................................53 
8.  Naval Surface Warfare Centers .................................................53 
9.  NSWC Corona ..............................................................................53 
10.  Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command ..........................54 
11.  NAVSEA 21 ..................................................................................55 
12.  Navy Inactive Ships Office ..........................................................55 
13.  NAVSEA 05 ..................................................................................56 
14.  Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific/Commander 
Naval Surface Forces Atlantic ....................................................56 
15.  Combatant Commanders ............................................................56 
16.  Naval Supply Systems Command ...............................................57 
17.  Defense Logistics Agency ............................................................57 
18.  Office of the Chief of Naval Operations .....................................58 
19.  Participating Acquisition Manager ............................................58 
20.  Regional Maintenance Centers ...................................................58 
21.  NAVSEA PMS 326 .......................................................................59 
a.  Commercial Shipyards ......................................................59 
b.  Third Party Advanced Planning Contractor ....................59 
K.  CUSTOMERS ..........................................................................................62 
L.  USERS .......................................................................................................62 
M.  TOP-LEVEL USE CASES ......................................................................62 
1.  Use Case 1: Implement Process ..................................................63 
2.  Use Case 2: Follow Process .........................................................64 
3.  Use Case 3: Update/Modify Process ...........................................65 
4.  Use Case 4: Discontinued Use .....................................................65 
V.  CONCEPTUALIZATION ..................................................................................67 
 ix
VI.  SELECTION OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL ............69 
VII.  PARTS HARVESTING PROCESS REQUIREMENTS .................................71 
VIII.  SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................73 
IX.  PROCESS DEFINITION ....................................................................................81 
A.  KICKOFF AND DETERMINE HARVESTING NEEDS ...................81 
1.  System Reliability Block Diagrams ............................................84 
2.  Fault Tree Analysis ......................................................................88 
3.  Determine Critical Parts .............................................................89 
4.  Determine the Sparing Requirement .........................................89 
5.  Determine Current Stock and Number Needed ........................91 
6.  Identify Number Available to Purchase and Number 
Available to Harvest and Costs ...................................................92 
7.  Perform Optimization Utilizing Model ......................................92 
8.  Iterate/Repeat Process as Necessary ..........................................93 
9.  Ship Checks (if Required) ...........................................................93 
10.  Consolidate Inputs .......................................................................94 
B.  PLAN EQUIPMENT REMOVAL .........................................................94 
1.  Establish Harvesting Operation Availability ............................94 
2.  Plan Ships Force Equipment Removal ......................................94 
3.  Plan Government Entity Equipment Removal .........................95 
4.  Plan Industrial Activity Equipment Removal ...........................95 
C.  FUND PARTS HARVESTING ..............................................................96 
1.  Submit POM Issue Paper ............................................................96 
2.  Establish Contract Vehicle ..........................................................96 
3.  Fund Planning/Execution ............................................................96 
D.  REMOVE EQUIPMENT FROM DECOM SHIP ................................96 
1.  SF Remove Equipment ................................................................97 
2.  GE Remove Equipment ...............................................................97 
3.  IA Remove Equipment ................................................................97 
E.  STORE EQUIPMENT (WAREHOUSING) .........................................97 
F.  SHIP EQUIPMENT.................................................................................98 
G.  DOCUMENT IN ERP .............................................................................98 
H.  REFURBISH HARVESTED EQUIPMENT .........................................98 
I.  DISPOSE UNNECESSARY COMPONENTS ......................................99 
J.  WRAP-UP AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS .......................99 
1.  Wrap-Up .......................................................................................99 
2.  Measures of Effectiveness ............................................................99 
 x
X.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................101 
A.  HARVESTING PARTS USING A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
PRINCIPLE-BASED PROCESS IS WORTHWHILE ......................101 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................104 
C.  AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY .......................................................105 
XI.  SUPPLEMENTAL .............................................................................................107 
A.  MODEL FOR DETERMINING SPARING QUANTITY 
REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................107 
B.  MODEL FOR PARTS HARVESTING SYSTEM 
OPTIMIZATION ...................................................................................107 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................109 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................113 
 
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  USS Samuel B. Roberts Damage from Mine Hit .........................................6 
Figure 2.  U.S. Navy Mine Casualties Since the End of WWII ...................................8 
Figure 3.  Mine Warfare Regions .................................................................................9 
Figure 4.  A Chen-Series Bottom Mine Aboard a Chinese Surface Warship ............10 
Figure 5.  An Illustration of a Buoyant Moored Mine  Anchored to the Seafloor .....11 
Figure 6.  Drifting Mine .............................................................................................11 
Figure 7.  Limpet Mine MK1 .....................................................................................12 
Figure 8.  USS Avenger (MCM-1) Neutralizing a Mine ............................................14 
Figure 9.  Seven Straits that Serve as Major Trade Routes for  Global Oil 
Distribution ................................................................................................15 
Figure 10.  Volume of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Transported  through 
World Chokepoints, 2007–2011 ................................................................16 
Figure 11.  MCM-1 Class Decommission Plan ............................................................20 
Figure 12.  MCM Mission Package Capabilities Plan .................................................21 
Figure 13.  Parts Harvesting Functional Decomposition .............................................27 
Figure 14.  Scenario-Based Risk Identification–Repair and Maintain Scenarios ........35 
Figure 15.  Scenario-Based Risk Identification–Repair Parts Scenarios .....................35 
Figure 16.  MCM Parts Harvesting Risk Assessment Matrix ......................................37 
Figure 18.  MCM-1 Class Ship Functional Decomposition .........................................73 
Figure 19.  Parts Harvesting Process ............................................................................81 
Figure 20.  System Critical Component Sustainment Analysis Functional Flow 
Diagram......................................................................................................83 
Figure 21.  MCM-1 Avenger Class RBD .....................................................................85 
Figure 22.  MCM Auxiliaries Section of RBD ............................................................86 
Figure 23.  Series View of Figure 22 ...........................................................................87 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  MCM Parts Harvesting Risks ....................................................................36 
Table 2.  Notional MCM-1 Class Parts Harvesting Operations Schedule ................44 
Table 3.  Stakeholder Matrix .....................................................................................49 
Table 4.  Stakeholder Needs Analysis ......................................................................60 
Table 5.  Parts Harvesting Process Requirements .....................................................71 
Table 6.  MCM-1 Class Ship Function to Form Mapping ........................................78 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
3PP third party planning 
 
AC air conditioning 
Ao operational availability 
AOR area of responsibility 
APL  allowance parts list  
ASW anti-submarine warfare 
 
BCA  business case analysis 
BSP  battle space profiler  
 
C3F Commander Third Fleet 
C4I  command, control, communications, computers, & intelligence 
C5F Commander Fifth Fleet 
C7F Commander Seventh Fleet 
CASREP casualty reports 
CBSP Commercial Broadband Satellite Provider 
CEP Class Execution Plan 
CG Cruisers 
CHT collection holding & transfer 
cm configuration management 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
CNSL Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic 
CNSP Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific 
COCOM Combatant Commander 
CEP  class execution plans  
CPP controllable pitch propeller 
CS combat systems 
CW chill water 
 
DECOM decommissioning 
DFS departure from specification 
DLA Defense Logistics Agency 
 
EFD  equipment functional description  
ERP enterprise resource planning  
ESL expected service life 
 
FFG Frigates 
FMS foreign military sales 
FTA fault tree analysis 
FY fiscal year 
 xvi
GCCS global command and control system 
GE government entity 
GFE  government furnished equipment  
GFI government furnished information 
 
HF High Frequency 
HM&E hull mechanical & electrical 
 
IA industrial activity 
ICAS  Integrated Control Assessment System  
IED improvised explosive devices 
IPT integrated product team 
ISCS  Integrated Shipboard Control System  
ISEA in service engineering agent 
ISIC Immediate Superior in Command 
 
JFMM Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual 
 
LCS littoral combat ship 
LO lube oil 
LoS Line of Sight 
 
MARAD Maritime Administration 
MCM mine countermeasure 
MCMRON mine countermeasure squadrons 
MD Mini DAMA 
MDA  mine danger area  
MDE  mine danger environment 
MEDAL mine warfare and environmental decision aids library 
MHC Osprey-class Coastal Minehunters 
MIW mine warfare 
MLDT mean logistics downtime 
MMGTG magnetic minesweep gas turbine generator 
MOE  measures of effectiveness  
MPAC medium pressure air compressor 
MPDE main propulsion diesel engine 
MSMO  multi-ship-multi-option  
MT maintenance team 
MTBF mean time between failures 
MTTR mean time to repair 
 
N95 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command 
NIPR non-secure internet protocol 
NMD  Navy maintenance database  
NSA Naval Supervisory Authority 
 xvii
NSTM Naval Ships’ Technical Manual 
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Centers 
 
OM&S Operating Materials and Supplies 
 
P/S Port/Starboard 
PARM participating acquisition manager 
PDF portable format document 
PE port engineer 
PESTOIN Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Infrastructure, and 
Networks 
PINS precise integrated navigation system 
POC point of contact 
POM program objective memorandum 
PPBE  planning, programming, budgeting, and execution  
PW potable water 
 
RBD reliability block diagram 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
RFI ready for issue 
RFP request for proposal 
RKC Readiness Kill Chain 
RMC regional maintenance center 
RMMV Remote Multi-mission Vehicle 
RMS Remote Minehunting System 
RO reverse osmosis  
 
Sat Satellite 
SBS ship building specialist 
SF ships force 
SIPR secure internet protocol router 
SME subject matter experts 
SMP surface master plan 
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
SPF single point of failure 
SSPG solid state pulse generator 
SSV Small Ship Variant 
SW seawater 
SWE Surface Warfare Enterprise 
 
TWH technical warrant holder 
TXV thermal expansion valve 





U.S. United States 
UCHS Umbilical Cable Handling System 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UN United Nations 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
 
VHF very high frequency 
VSB  validation, screening, and brokering  
 
WPER work package execution review 
WRFT warship ready for tasking 
WWI World War I 
WWII World War II 
 




The naval mine is an inexpensive weapon that can be used to deny entry into a 
given body of water. As per the United States (U.S.) Navy program office report 
regarding mine warfare (MIW) in the 21st century, mines have caused more damage to 
U.S. naval ships than any other armament since the end of World War II (U.S. Navy, 
Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 
2009, 8). Further, Naval mines can deny commercial vessel traffic movement within a 
port or passage through a sea-lane that can result in catastrophic economic impacts. The 
United States must be able to deter and respond to this threat to ensure naval dominance 
in support of the nation’s defense, keep sea-lanes open for the safe transit of commercial 
traffic, and to prevent economic upheaval. One of the primary means to deter and respond 
to MIW is the mine countermeasure (MCM-1) class ships. These 11 ships are 
strategically placed around the world to deter MIW and respond to mine countermeasure 
operations if required.  
To sustain the material condition of the MCM-1 class ships, adequate repair parts 
are required to ensure the ships are operationally ready and that they can reach expected 
service life. Due to the MCM-1 class ships’ age, various system(s)’ single point failure 
design, installed equipment material low-permeability requirements, and extremely small 
population and demand of critical spare parts (as compared to the rest of the U.S. Surface 
Navy), it is extremely challenging to provide repair parts required for the ship class to 
achieve operational availability objectives. Further exacerbating this challenge is the fact 
that the replacement for the MCM-1 class ship is currently being developed and any 
increase in MCM-1 class ship sustainment costs for repair parts can result in delays to the 
replacement platform. Strategies proposed by the Diminishing Manufacturing Sources 
and Material Shortages guidebook to address this problem have included lifetime buys 
from an original equipment manufacturer or reverse engineering of obsolete components 
(Defense Standardization Program Office 2009). Neither of these two strategies is 
sustainable as both are extremely expensive and typically very time consuming. A 
realistic means to mitigate the repair part challenge is by harvesting components off 
 xx
MCM-1 class ships as they decommission to restore the components for reuse on the 
remaining in-service ships. The problem is that no documented procedure outlining how 
to harvest parts effectively off decommissioning (DECOM) MCM-1 class ships exists 
today. Failure to address this issue will negatively impact the United States’ ability to 
conduct mine countermeasure operations and is simply not acceptable based on the threat 
and potential impacts to the United States and its allies.  
Systems engineering principles were utilized to analyze the problem and to 
develop a parts harvesting procedure that will meet stakeholder needs. This thesis 
recommends that the parts harvesting procedure be implemented to support the next 
MCM-1 class DECOM currently scheduled for fiscal year (FY) 19. It is noteworthy that 
the process includes budgeting for parts harvesting operations, which require planning 
efforts to commence in FY16. This essential process was developed to be both executable 
and cost-effective while striving to meet platform operational availability objectives at 
both the individual shipboard system, as well as the system of systems platform level. 
The procedure outlines the development of an integrated product team (IPT) that will 
perform 10 major functions as follows. 
 Kickoff/Determine Harvesting Needs—Establishes IPT and provides 
engineering rigor and two models to support parts harvesting needs 
identification. The first model helps to determine sparing requirements for 
a given part and the second model minimizes cost to meet the sparing 
objective whether from procuring the part from a vendor or harvesting a 
component and refurbishing it for reuse. 
 Plan Equipment Removal—Develop plan and/or work specifications to 
harvest equipment for ships force, government entities, and shipyard 
contractor. Also establishes a parts harvesting availability. 
 Fund Parts Harvesting—Includes development and submission of budget 
request in support of harvesting operations, establishes contract vehicle to 
perform the availability, and funds the execution of the harvesting 
operation. 
 Remove Equipment from DECOM Ship—Discusses removal of 
equipment from DECOM ship by appropriate entity (ships force, 
government, contractor). 
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 Store Equipment/Warehousing—Accounts for storing equipment once 
initially removed from DECOM ship in the ship repair facility, as well as 
warehousing long term. 
 Ship Equipment—Describes need to coordinate and ship equipment 
following harvesting operation to the appropriate storage or repair facility. 
Accounts for scheduling shipments to warehouses open during regular 
business hours as well. 
 Document in ERP—All harvested material must be documented in the 
Navy Enterprise Resource Program in accordance with applicable 
Operating Materials and Supplies (OM&S) procedures. 
 Refurbish Harvested Equipment—Outlines assessing and refurbishing 
harvested equipment that can be utilized to support the in-service ships. 
 Dispose of Unnecessary Components—Accounts for equipment harvested 
but found to be in an uneconomical repair condition and requires disposal. 
 Wrap-up and Measures of Effectiveness—Closes out the parts harvesting 
operation and solicits feedback for process improvement. Describes 
measures of effectiveness metrics that should be tracked to determine 
harvesting operation level of success. 
The methodology used to develop the parts harvesting procedure was an 
evolutionary systems engineering process model, as depicted in Figure 1. Using the 
evolutionary model facilitates process improvement based on feedback following each 
harvesting operation. Both technical and administrative changes will be required to keep 
the harvesting process procedure relevant over time.  
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Figure 1. Parts Harvesting Development Evolutionary Model 
 
 
The analysis was conducted using systems engineering principles to facilitate 
process development and fulfilling the intent of each step in the evolutionary model 
depicted in Figure 1. User requirements were derived from the stakeholder analysis that 
outlined each of the parts harvesting operation stakeholder needs. The stakeholder needs 
facilitated the user requirements development. The system requirements arose from 
various system engineering principles and tools. The first was the parts harvesting 
operation functional decomposition. Understanding the functions that part harvesting 
operations required was fundamental to developing the system requirements. Each of the 
functions is a detailed section of the parts harvesting procedure that was developed, 
which was also fundamental to the procedure architecture design. One of the system 
requirements was to determine which components were critical on an MCM-1 class 
ships. This problem was solved by developing an MCM-1 class functional 
decomposition, mapping the ship functions to the physical form, building platform-level 
reliability block diagrams, and performing reliability and operational availability 
calculations to determine problematic systems and/or critical components. Problematic 
 xxiii
systems were then further analyzed using fault tree analysis to determine components 
negatively impacting operational availability, which could be great parts harvesting 
candidates. System sparing requirements were accomplished by developing a sparing 
model. The sparing model accounted for the probability of having a unique spare part at a 
given time, as well as the total number used in the fleet, the component failure rate, and 
operating time left in the system service life. Cost-effectiveness was addressed by 
building a linear program model that accounted for obtaining the sparing model 
requirement while minimizing cost as calculated based on the quantity of a part needed, 
the quantity of that part available for purchase or harvest, the expected repairable rate of 
harvested parts and cost of repair, the cost to harvest or purchase each, and the cost to 
store each. 
Both the architecture and component development of the harvesting procedure 
was further facilitated by the functional decomposition. The functional decomposition 
was broken down until the individual process components were understood. Further, 
analyzing the system boundaries aided in the parts harvesting procedure constraints and 
assumptions identification, which further facilitated the architecture and component 
development.  
The integration of the parts harvesting procedure was accomplished by analyzing 
the component interfaces, exhaustive research based on prior harvesting operations 
within the Surface Navy community, and understanding each functional process owners, 
dependencies, and behaviors. Verification was accomplished by analyzing the parts 
harvesting procedure to ensure all requirements would be fulfilled.  
Conceptually, the parts harvesting procedure will be validated by meeting the 
stakeholder needs. However, validation will truly be realized by a review of the measures 
of effectiveness following the use of this process to conduct a parts harvesting operation. 
The measures of effectiveness (MOE) include usage over time, cost avoidance, and 
system operational availability. The most critical of these three MOEs is usage rate over 
time. If the harvested components are not used, then cost avoidance due to parts 
harvesting will not be possible, as costs would not be avoided. Additionally, system 
 xxiv
operational availability, and specifically, mean logistics down time, will not be 
influenced at all by parts harvesting operations if the reclaimed components are not used. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and recommend a cost-effective process to 
develop parts harvesting requirements for decommissioning MCM-1 class ships utilizing 
systems engineering principles. This process is critical to sustain the remaining in-service 
MCM-1 class ships. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
MCM-1 class ships are nearing the end of their service life and require material 
from decommissioning assets to keep the remaining ships operational. However, the 
Navy currently lacks a documented procedure outlining the steps required to harvest parts 
off a decommissioning ship slated to be dismantled. Therefore, the following research 
questions are answered in this thesis. 
 What is parts harvesting?  
 Why is harvesting of material from MCM-1 class ships important?  
 Does a cost effective means exist to determine what should be harvested 
off a decommissioning ship? 
 What systems engineering applications or principles can be applied to 
effectively harvest parts from MCM-1 class ships to sustain the remaining 
in-service ships through expected service life?  
 What are the constraints to an effective parts harvesting system/process?  
 What are the measures of effectiveness?  
B. BACKGROUND 
To understand the importance of effectively harvesting parts from 
decommissioning MCM-1 class ships fully, it is first important to understand the history 
and mission of these ships. This background section covers mine warfare history, the 
mine warfare threat, and the importance of mine warfare. Further, this background 
information provides some of the building blocks to taking a systems engineering 
approach properly to developing an effective parts harvesting process.  
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1. Mine Warfare History 
The naval mine dates back to the late 1500s with the Dutch floating explosives 
down the Scheldt River to destroy a bridge the Spanish Army had built to keep 
Amsterdam from access to the sea (Levie 1992). An Italian engineer, Frederico Gianbelli, 
who was working for the Dutch at the time, utilized boats filled with ammunition 
containing a triggering device to dispose of the Spaniards (Levie 1992). While this 
“floating petard” did not detonate under water, or depend on a vessel to be present, as is 
the case with most mines today, it can be considered the beginning of mine warfare 
(MIW) (Cowie 1949). The first successful mine was invented by David Bushnell during 
the American Revolution in 1776 (Cowie 1949). General George Washington 
commissioned Bushnell to develop a mine to counter the British Navy blockade of 
Philadelphia (Levie 1992). The mine was a wooden keg filled with gunpowder that could 
be floated down a river using floats and detonated upon contact (Levie 1992). 
Unfortunately, the mine did not damage the British frigate Cerberus as planned. 
However, the mine did detonate and sank a captured vessel the British were sailing 
alongside the Cerberus (Levie 1992).  
Sea mines were also used often during the Civil War. In particular, the 
Confederate Navy utilized mines as the strategic sea-denial weapon of choice (U.S. 
Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare 
Directorate 2009). The Confederates also had a mine organization focused on research 
and development that even included a spy network to increase mine effectiveness  
(U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare 
Directorate 2009). To counter the threat, the Union Navy developed mine 
countermeasures and tactics, albeit reluctantly at times (Melia 1991). The Union Navy’s 
development of these countermeasures and tactics were almost all developed and 
improvised onboard each ship by the crew and captain (Melia 1991). Some of these 
countermeasure principles are still applicable today. By the end of the war, the 
Confederate mines had successfully sunk 48 Union ships and even 11 of their own (U.S. 
Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare 
Directorate 2009). 
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The first significant use of sea mines in deep or “blue” water occurred during the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and 
Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). The Russians mine warfare 
tactics were to lay mines in a defensive pattern (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office 
Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). The Japanese chose 
an offensive tactic and placed mines in deep water areas (U.S. Navy, Program Executive 
Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). The mines 
utilized by both the Russians and Japanese resulted in the loss of three battleships, five 
cruisers, four destroyers, two torpedo boats, and one minelayer (U.S. Navy, Program 
Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). 
The Russians sank more ships through mine warfare than by any other means (U.S. 
Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare 
Directorate 2009).  
Several mines were utilized during World Wars I and II (WWI; WWII). During 
WWI, “British and U.S. ships laid more than 73,000 mines” during the “North Sea Mine 
Barrage” (June–October 1918) (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009, 4). This campaign was successful in 
sinking 13 U-Boats and kept several in port until Armistice Day. During WWII, several 
different types of mines were also developed and used with ranging results throughout 
the encounter: advanced magnetic, acoustic, pressure influence, and electrical-
potential/antenna-fired weapons (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). 
German U-boats were successful in laying over 300 mines in U.S. waters during 
WWII, ranging from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the Mississippi Delta (U.S. Navy, Program 
Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). 
This deployment of mines resulted in several port closures and even damaged 11 ships 
(U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare 
Directorate 2009). However, WWII was probably the United States’ most effective use of 
offensive mining. The U.S. Army (aircraft) and Navy were able to lay over “25,000 
mines in Japanese shipping routes” and around the Japanese home island (U.S. Navy, 
 4
Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 
2009, 4). This operation shutdown almost all commerce to the country and resulted in 
760 Japanese ships being sunk (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). The operation was appropriately 
named “Operation Starvation.” Even after the war was over, and all fighting had ceased, 
a considerable amount of mine clearing was required in U.S. waters, predominantly 
carried out by the Japanese (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). In 1971, the U.S. Navy estimated that 
greater than “2,000 sensitive influence mines in the Pacific waters” remained (U.S. Navy, 
Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 
2009, 4).  
The Korean conflict highlighted the U.S.’ lack of ability to conduct mine 
countermeasure operations. The October 1950 assault on Wonson, Korea, was 
completely thwarted by 3,000 mines (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and 
Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). The United Nations had a 250-
ship amphibious operation planned that could not take place due to the mines (U.S. Navy, 
Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 
2009). The task force commander, Admiral Allen E. Smith stated: 
We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a navy, using pre-
World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the 
birth of Christ. (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009, 4–5) 
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, also went on record stating: 
when you can’t go where you want to, when you want to, you haven’t got 
command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock-bottom foundation 
for all our war plans. We’ve been plenty submarine-conscious and air-
conscious. Now, we’re going to start getting mine-conscious—beginning 
last week! (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009, 5)  
Initial clearance operations were not successful and resulted in three countermeasure 
ships being sunk. By the end of the war in 1953, United Nations (UN) mine 
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countermeasure forces experienced 20% of the Naval casualties (U.S. Navy, Program 
Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009).  
Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Far East, also stated 
the following regarding the importance of mine warfare: 
The main lesson of the Wonsan operation is that no so-called subsidiary 
branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be 
neglected or relegated to a minor role in the future. Wonsan also taught us 
that we can be denied freedom of movement to an enemy objective 
through the intelligent use of mines by an alert foe. (Levie 1992, 142)  
During the Vietnam War, the United States utilized both mining and mine 
countermeasures (Levie 1992). The Viet Cong used all available mines (both homemade 
and more sophisticated mines obtained from the Soviet Union) in the Saigon River (Levie 
1992). Mining the Saigon River was the Viet Cong’s plan to block transportation to 
Saigon, then the main port of entry for South Vietnam (Levie 1992). However, the Viet 
Cong’s mining of the Saigon River was not very effective (Levie 1992). The United 
States used several mines during the Vietnam War. The Navy mined Haiphong harbor 
“with Destructor and magnetic-acoustic type mines” in an attempt “to bring the North 
Vietnamese to the Paris Peace Talks” (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and 
Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009, 5). U.S. forces laid thousands of 
mines and succeeded in basically stopping all water-borne trade in North Vietnam (U.S. 
Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare 
Directorate 2009). This operation was so effective that a Danish naval mine expert stated 
the following: 
Although the deployment of mines brings weapons to bear on the 
adversary, it need not draw blood to be effective. The Vietnam operation 
proved this beyond doubt. The minefields off the Vietnamese ports were 
so effective that only some boats tried to pass them. And the North 
Vietnamese made no serious attempt to sweep or otherwise counter them, 
for they estimated the risk to be too high. (Levie 1992)  
During the 1980s, Tanker War, the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) was severely 
damaged by an Iranian mine it hit on April 14, 1987, as shown in Figure 1. The ship was 
trying to avoid three floating mines, and in the process, was struck by a submerged 
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contact mine. While the mine was estimated to cost $1,500, the damage to the ship was 
approximately $96 million (Levie 1992; U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral 
and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009). 
Figure 1.  USS Samuel B. Roberts Damage from Mine Hit 
  
From U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary 
Warfare Directorate. 2009. 21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Ensuring Global 
Access and Commerce. Washington, DC: Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate, 5. 
In a letter to the Congress, President Reagan stated, “No doubt exists that Iran laid 
these mines for the specific purpose of damaging or sinking U.S. or other non-belligerent 
ships. We have warned Iran repeatedly against such hostile acts” (Levie 1992). During 
Operations Desert Shield/Storm (1990–1991), the Iraqis were laying sea mines in the 
Northern Arabian Gulf. The mines were a combination of WWII era and modern, 
multiple influence mines (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division Coastal 
Systems Station 1999). Two U.S. Navy ships experienced significant damage as a result. 
Both the USS Princeton (CG-59) and USS Tripoli (LPH-10) were struck by Iraqi mines in 
the Persian Gulf. The total damage to both ships was approximately $26 million in 
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repairs plus collateral costs, such as the time and resources for the ship to travel back to 
the ship yard, cost to send a replacement ship to complete the mission, time lost on the 
mission, and injuries sustained by the crewmembers. By comparison, the total cost of the 
two mines that caused the damage was approximately $11,500. Shortly after the mine 
hits, U.S. Commanders were forced to change course and scrap plans for an amphibious 
assault designed to retake Kuwait City (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division 
Coastal Systems Station 1999; U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009).  
This synopsis of U.S. MIW history clearly shows not only the enemy intentions to 
conduct MIW, but that MIW can be quite effective when U.S. forces are not adequately 
prepared to deter the threat. MIW has prevented the U.S. dominance of waterways on 
various occasions and appears it will be one of the first weapons of choice in future 
encounters with the United States or its allies. The ongoing challenge with respect to the 
naval mines is whether the United States and its allies will be prepared to counter the 
MIW tactics used by enemy forces, be it another nation, peer competitor, or rogue state in 
the future.  
2. Mine Warfare Threat 
The naval mine is a relatively inexpensive weapon that can simply wait for its 
victim to cross its path. This weapon can cripple and even destroy a Navy vessel, if not 
properly countered or disabled. The naval mine can have significant psychological effects 
as well. Simply the threat of a mine in a given body of water can restrict vessel 
movements. This weapon is unique in that it does not have to detonate to be an effective 
deterrent, and to fulfill its reason for existence. The naval mine is an extremely effective 
weapon to neutralize the execution of various missions on a given body of water for both 
sides of a conflict (Rios 2005).  
Even with the present technologically advanced U.S. Navy fleet, MIW 
technologies have remained a very viable threat. Despite various advances in reducing 
ship acoustic or magnetic signatures, the navy mine technology continues to adapt as well 
(Rios 2005). To that end, approximately 250,000 “sea mines of more than 300 types are 
 8
in the inventories” of the various navies around the world (U.S. Navy, Program Executive 
Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009, 7). To make 
matters even more challenging, these figures do not include improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) that can be made from 55-gallon drums or a household appliance. Since the end of 
WWII, mines have damaged or sunk three times more U.S. Navy ships than all other 
means combined, as outlined in Figure 2 (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral 
and Mine Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009).  
Figure 2.  U.S. Navy Mine Casualties Since the End of WWII 
 
From U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary 
Warfare Directorate. 2009. 21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Ensuring Global 
Access and Commerce. Washington, DC: Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate. 
Mines or IEDs can operate within four water depth regions, as depicted in Figure 
3: surf zone & CLZ (0–10″ of water), very shallow water (10″–40″ of water), shallow 




Figure 3.  Mine Warfare Regions 
 
From U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare Expeditionary 
Warfare Directorate. 2009. 21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Ensuring Global 
Access and Commerce. Washington, DC: Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate, 9. 
While mines or IEDs can be made in several different configurations and operate 
in the above water depths, mines are comprised of four main types: bottom mines, 
moored and buoyant mines, limpet mines, and drifting mines. 
a. Bottom Mines 
Bottom or “ground” mines are negatively buoyant and rest on the ocean floor. 
They are held down by their own weight and may sink into bottom sediment at times, 
further complicating mine-hunting operations. These mines range in size from 36-inch 
cone shaped contraptions to weapons that are 12 feet long as seen in Figure 4. The 
bottom mines are most effective against surface ships in shallow waters. However, the 
bottom mines are also effective against submarines in deep water (Naval Surface Warfare 
Center Dahlgren Division Coastal Systems Station 1999; Truver 2012). 
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Figure 4.  A Chen-Series Bottom Mine Aboard a Chinese Surface Warship 
 
From Erickson, Andrew, Lyle Goldstein, and William Murray. 2007. “China’s Undersea 
Sentries.” Undersea Warfare the Official Magazine of the U.S. Submarine Force, 9(2) 
Winter. 
b. Buoyant Moored Mines 
Moored mines are in a positively buoyant casing, and maintain a constant vertical 
distance from the sea floor via a cable and anchor as per Figure 5. Since the casing for the 
mine must be filled with air to create the positive buoyancy, not as much room is 
available for explosives, as compared to a bottom mine. However, moored mines can be 
outfitted with influence sensors or rockets/torpedoes that increase their lethality (Naval 






Figure 5.  An Illustration of a Buoyant Moored Mine  
Anchored to the Seafloor 
 
From Exelis Inc. 2013. Sea Mine Fact Sheet. McLean, VA: Exelis Inc. 
c. Drifting Mines 
Drifting or “floating” mines shown in Figure 6 are also positively buoyant and 
float at or near the water surface. If the drifting mine is not anchored, or has broken loose 
from its anchor, it literally just floats along with the current and is completely 
indiscriminate as to target that can cause any passing vessel’s demise. The Hague 
Convention of 1907 outlawed the practice of using drifting mines; however, they are still 
used in conflicts today (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division Coastal 
Systems Station 1999; Truver 2012). The U.S. Navy has removed all drifting mines from 
its arsenal (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division Coastal Systems Station 
1999; Truver 2012).  
Figure 6.  Drifting Mine 
 
From Exelis Inc. 2013. Sea Mine Fact Sheet. McLean, VA: Exelis Inc. 
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d. Limpet Mines 
Limpet mines are attached directly to the hull of a ship by divers and are set to 
explode after being put in place. An example is shown in Figure 7. This mine type may 
be outfitted with an anti-handling device that will detonate the weapon if removed from 
the hull of the ship.  
Figure 7.  Limpet Mine MK1 
 
From Australian War Memorial. 2014. “Limpet Mine MK 1.” Australian War Memorial. 
Accessed August 13. http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/REL/19386.001. 
The various mine types can be fired in three main ways. The firing initiation 
methods are “contact, sensing the signatures or “influences” of a ship or submarine,” and 
detonation on command (Truver 2012, 35). 
Contact fired mines can be of the moored or drifting mine types. As the name 
suggestions, the mine is detonated when coming into contact with a target. Most of the 
contact mines have “a chemical horn that” acts as a battery once it is broken (Truver 
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2012, 35). This action triggers the detonation. Contact mines are the oldest style mines 
still in existence today. 
Influence fired mines can be utilized on the bottom or moored mine types. These 
mines utilize sensors to trigger detonation. The sensors can range from magnetic, 
acoustic, seismic, underwater electrical potential, and pressure sensors. One of the 
sensors, or a combination of several sensors, can be utilized to sense a ship or submarine 
approaching and detonate on command. The detonation is typically accomplished via a 
microcomputer that interfaces with the sensors on the mine. 
Command-detonated mines can be either bottom or moored mine types. These 
weapons are fired once the target enters the minefield. They are usually utilized for 
harbor or restricted sea-lanes (Truver 2012).  
3. Mine Warfare Importance  
Today, MIW is still very much a threat that the United States must address. To 
have successful efficient and secure transit of goods in today’s global economy, 
waterways must remain open and free from criminal and terrorist networks with mine 
laying capabilities. The number one goal of the National Strategy for Global Supply 
Chain Security is to promote the efficient and secure movement of goods (Office of the 
President of the United States 2012).  
As outlined in the MIW history section earlier, the United States has been unable 
to conduct amphibious operations due to mining by the enemy, and various ships were 
severely damaged during a few conflicts. Due to these challenges, it very important for 
the Navy to take “consistent, aggressive and focused action to ensure that it is prepared 
for all future mine events” (U.S. Navy, Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare Expeditionary Warfare Directorate 2009, 1).  
To keep the waterways open, the United States must work with allies to identify 
any mine-laying activities as soon as possible. Using intelligence to prevent the enemy 
from ever laying mines is the best MIW strategy. However, it is not always feasible. For 
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this reason, the MCM-1 Avenger class mine countermeasure ships were built and put in 
service as depicted in Figure 8.  
Figure 8.  USS Avenger (MCM-1) Neutralizing a Mine 
 
From Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. 2014a. “Mine 
Countermeasures Ships (MCM).” Accessed April 26. http://www.public.navy.mil/ 
surfor/pages/MineCountermeasuresShips.aspx#.U1vH7-ZdX-I.  
These ships are designed to hunt, detect, and neutralize mines. Enemies can 
develop mines for as little as $1,000 (Gough 2013, 1). Sea mines can be used to damage 
or sink ships that cost upward of several billion dollars. Mines also can be used to deter 
shipping from entering or leaving a specific body of water, usually as a military tactic. 
While mines can certainly cause significant material damage to vessels, deny traffic 
through a sea lane, or even result in the loss of lives, an economic effect also results 
(Chatham House The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2014, 3). The economic 
impact of laying mines in any of today’s choke points (e.g., Strait of Hormuz, Strait of 
Malacca, Suez Canal, and Panama Canal) would be very significant. The seven straits 
highlighted in Figure 9 are major trade routes for global oil commerce, as defined by the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. Figure 10 outlines the volume of petroleum 
products transiting the waterways each day. Not only would a reduction or complete stop 
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of vessel traffic in a single strait cause oil and other goods prices to jump, the alternate 
routes would be significantly longer for commercial ships to travel. 
Figure 9.  Seven Straits that Serve as Major Trade Routes for  
Global Oil Distribution 
 
From U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2012. World Oil Transit Chokepoints. 









Figure 10.  Volume of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Transported  
through World Chokepoints, 2007–2011 
  
From U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2012. World Oil Transit Chokepoints. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
For example, approximately $1.7 billion (assuming $100/barrel) of oil flows 
through the Strait of Hormuz per day. If just 10% of the normal vessel movement through 
the strait was disrupted due to mines, an almost instantaneous 75%+ rise in the price of 
oil would result (Office of Naval Intelligence 2010). Obviously, this situation would have 
negative global implications. The blockage of a chokepoint will not only drive up oil and 
energy costs, but significantly risk leaving commercial tankers open to piracy, terrorist 
attacks, and political unrest that can lead to war. All these factors can contribute to 
possible oil spills that have follow-on political, economic, and environmental impacts. To 
say the least, the United States’ ability to conduct MIW operations, particularly mine 
countermeasures via the 11 remaining surface MCM ships, is essential for economic 
stability, keeping the sea-lanes open for commerce, and naval dominance during conflicts 
or peacetime projection of power. 
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C. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The benefit of applying systems engineering practices for harvesting material 
from MCM-1 class ships as they decommission is that the class can be sustained at a 
more reasonable cost while meeting operational requirements. Neither will be possible 
without a process in place to make efficient use of reclaimed material. Further, harvesting 
operations resource sponsors will clearly understand that a systematic approach was used 
to give them the confidence that the resources they apply will have a significant return on 
investment, both financially and operationally. 
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II. RESEARCH: MINE WARFARE CAPACITY—TODAY AND 
TOMORROW 
The MCM-1 class ships are slated to be replaced eventually by the LCS MIW 
MP. This replacement is significant to understand, as resource sponsors in OPNAV N95 
must pay for both in-service MCM-1 class ships’ sustainment to fulfill today’s mine 
countermeasure requirements, as well as funding the development and construction of 
tomorrow’s platforms. While funding levels remain a continuous challenge, being able to 
sustain the MCM-1 class ships in the most economic manner possible is vital to both in-
service and new construction spend plans. This concept is critical to remember 
throughout this thesis when analyzing the need for a cost-effective parts harvesting 
process for MCM-1 class ships. 
A. MCM-1 CLASS SHIPS’ EXPECTED SERVICE LIFE  
Each year, the Department of the Navy provides Congress with an annual long-
range plan for the new construction of Navy ships as per title 10, U.S.C., section 231 as 
amended requirements. As per a letter dated July 1, 2014, from the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Work, to the Honorable Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed 
Services for the U.S. Senate, this plan “outlines the naval force structure requirements 
that are consistent with the strategic priorities and guidance contained in Sustaining U.S. 
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense; the construction plan necessary 
to meet these requirements; and the fiscal resources necessary to implement the plan.” 
The plan provides insight into how long the MCMs must be operational until 
decommissioning and a proposed schedule for the replacement platform, which is the 
littoral combat ship (LCS) containing the MIW mission module. Three of the MCM-1 
class ships (Avenger, Defender, and Guardian) have already been decommissioned and 
scrapped. The remaining MCMs will need to be operational until decommissioning of 
each ship is complete, which is currently scheduled for 2024 as per Figure 11.  
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Figure 11.  MCM-1 Class Decommission Plan 
 
From Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N95). 2015. MCM-1 Class Decommission 
Plan. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 
As of July 22, 2015, the next MCMs to be decommissioned will be the USS 
Sentry (MCM-3) in FY2019, followed by USS Devastator (MCM-6) in FY2020. 
However, fleet has proposed replacing the USS Sentry (MCM-3) with the USS Champion 
(MCM-4) in FY19 and the USS Devastator (MCM-6) with the USS Scout (MCM-8) in 
FY20. These decommissionings are awaiting leadership final adjudication. Regardless of 
the ship name, one MCM in FY19 and FY20 will be decommissioned and both ships are 
already slated to be dismantled following decommissioning (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Integration of Capabilities and Resources) 
(N8) 2015, 15). 
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B. READINESS KILL CHAIN/SURFACE MASTER PLAN/CLASS 
EXECUTION PLANS AND MINE WARFARE TRANSITION FROM 
MINE COUNTERMEASURE TO LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP MINE 
WARFARE MISSION PACKAGE  
While the current plan is to decommission the last MCM in 2024, a bit of a wild 
card remains in that the LCS MIW mission package most likely needs to be fully 
operational on the LCS platform to replace the current capabilities of the MCM-1 class 
ships. A fully functional LCS platform, coupled with the MIW MP capabilities, is needed 
to enable the MCM-1 class ships to decommission as planned. The LCS MIW MP is 
utilizing an evolutionary development acquisition strategy as depicted in Figure 12. 
Figure 12.  MCM Mission Package Capabilities Plan 
  
From Siel, Carl, Dave Welch, Tom Anderson, John Ailes, and Dan Brintzinghoffer. 
2014. LCS Update. Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 22. 
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In the event any of the LCS MIW MP increments’ planning timelines are 
changed, it could potentially alter the MCM decommissioning dates. The next planned 
MCM decommissioning will be in FY2019; therefore, any MCM sustainment plans, 
including parts harvesting projects, will also have to take the LCS MIW MP status into 
account as well. The surface Navy is tracking this situation closely via the Surface 
Warfare Enterprise (SWE), which acts as a single voice for all non-nuclear surface ships.  
In 2012, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF) and Commander, U.S. Fleet 
Forces (CUSFF) instituted the Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, 
Infrastructure, and Networks (PESTOIN) Pillar-based Readiness Kill Chain (RKC) 
approach to identify fleet readiness shortfalls and prioritize resources to address 
deficiencies. Also in 2012, the Surface Board endorsed the creation of class execution 
plans (CEP) and a surface master plan (SMP) to consolidate and integrate surface ship 
class and force planning. As a result of those decisions, an integrated assessment of 
wholeness by class and by pillar and an integrated recommended action list for SWE 
stakeholders now exist (Commander Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet 2014b, 1).  
The SWE charter also outlines the SWE objectives. Objective number two clearly 
deals with the MCM to LCS MIW MP transition. “Use the CEPs and the SMP to 
consolidate ship class and Force planning across the PESTOIN pillars to synchronize 
efforts, maintain the relevance and capability of the Force throughout its expected service 
life and facilitate a repeatable and transparent framework for implementing decisions” 
(Commander Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet 2014b, 2). 
The most current SMP outlines that “uncertainty in timing for the LCS mine 
countermeasures mission modules” exists (Surface Warfare Enterprise 2014, 58). The 
mission modules progress, or lack thereof, must be closely tracked utilizing the SMP and 
CEPs for both LCS and MCM class ships to ensure the appropriate harvesting operations 
can be planned accordingly. If the LCS MIW MP fielding plan starts slipping, this 
slippage could lead to a need for increasing MCM service life, which would affect any 
parts harvesting plans based on the currently planned 2024 MCM ESL.  
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C. CURRENT FUNDING ENVIRONMENT (CONSTRAINTS) AND 
IMPACTS TO MIW  
While the previous section discusses LCS MIW MP fielding plan impacts due to 
technical challenges that could prevent meeting fielding plan goals, funding impacts can 
also impact current LCS MP fielding plans. In the event that funding constraints start to 
influence LCS MCM mission package delivery, funding constraints also could impact the 
MCM-1 class ships by forcing the Navy to extend some portion of the ships’ expected 
service life. This risk is clearly feasible as depicted in an Inside the Navy article: 
Significant cuts to the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship’s mission modules 
program, included in Congress” recent $1.1 trillion fiscal year 2015 
omnibus spending bill, will increase life-cycle costs and result in further 
schedule delays to testing and fielding of the mission packages, according 
to information from a recent report to Congress.  
The appropriations bill significantly reduced procurement and research, 
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the LCS mission 
modules. Appropriators zeroed out procurement funding for the LCS 
remote minehunting system (RMS), an integral component of the mine 
countermeasures (MCM) mission package, and anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) mission modules. 
Further, the bill reduced RDT&E funds for the LCS mission packages 
from $196.9 million to $176.9 million due to “program execution,” 
according to a report accompanying the appropriations bill.  
Reductions in mission funds “has an impact on the whole mission set that 
the Navy has to perform and the request from the combatant commands 
around the globe,” Rep. Rob Wittman (R-VA), chairman of the House 
Armed Services readiness subcommittee, told Inside the Navy in a Dec. 17 
interview.  
Appropriators likely decided to cut funds for the LCS mission modules in 
order to send a message to the Navy that they are frustrated with delays, 
cost increases and setbacks in the program, Wittman said. (Seligman 2014, 
1–3) 
The article further states: 
Cuts to LCS mission modules will also impact the Navy’s ability to move 
forward with the RMS development. The program has in recent years 
faced criticism for both ballooning costs and repeated schedule delays.  
An operational assessment of the newest version of the Remote Multi-
Mission Vehicle (RMMV) was delayed by six months earlier this year, 
resulting in a modest cost impact to the program, ITN reported in June. 
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The assessment was initially slated to start in mid-January and run through 
the end of the February, but was pushed to July and August. The 6.0 
configuration is an upgrade from the older 4.2 variant.  
Meanwhile, InsideDefense.com reported in August that the Navy deferred 
key actions on the RMS until the third quarter of FY-15, following the 
delay of a crucial Office of the Secretary of Defense review that was 
scheduled for May. That meeting, a Defense Acquisition Board milestone 
C review, is needed to validate four years of remedial engineering work 
and win back approval for low-rate production, which was rescinded in 
2010 in a bid to halt ballooning cost growth.  
Last December, the Navy completed a reliability growth program called 
for by the Pentagon’s acquisition executive in 2010 following a 
determination that “poor” management by the Navy of the RMS program 
was a major factor in cost growth of as much as 80 percent. 
Appropriators” decision to zero out the FY-15 funding line for the RMS 
program will likely impede the Navy’s plans to award a low-rate initial 
production contract for a new-start RMMV program. The Navy in August 
issued a request for proposals for the project. (Seligman 2014, 1–3) 
The article not only discusses RMS challenges, but also summarizes the sixth quarterly 
report to Congress for the LCS mission modules program that states that any reductions 
in FY15 funding would negatively impact the schedule and life cycle of the mission 
modules:  
reduced RDT&E funds for the LCS mission packages could delay  
the development, integration and testing of the unmanned influence  
sweep system–part of the MCM mission package–the surface-to-surface 
missile module–part of the SUW mission package–and/or the ASW 
mission package. Cuts could also delay opposite hull initial operational 
test and evaluation (IOT&E) mission packages, the report stated. 
(Seligman 2014, 1–3) 
The aforementioned technical, funding and political challenges to the LCS MIW 
mission package only increase the uncertainty that the MCM-1 class will in fact be able 
to decommission as planned. This uncertainty further increases the importance of 
effectively and efficiently harvesting parts off MCM-1 class ships as they decommission 
to ensure appropriate spares are available to provide the Navy with the maximum 
flexibility to bridge the gap between legacy MCM-1 ship capabilities to the new LCS 
MIW MP.  
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III.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Systems engineering provides a framework and strategy to solve problems. To 
support this claim, step one is to define accurately and understand the problem that must 
be solved. This chapter defines the problem, provides amplifying analysis as to why the 
problem exists, and explains the importance of solving the problem.  
A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Currently, no documented procedure exists that outlines how to harvest parts 
effectively off decommissioning MCM-1 class ships, and therefore, realistic or cost-
effective means are not available to provide required repair parts to sustain the MCM-1 
class ships’ mine-hunting capability. As discussed in the introduction, a degradation, not 
to mention elimination, of the mine-hunting capability can have disastrous effects on 
global trade and economies, the Navy’s ability to perform its missions, and even loss of 
life. Decommissioning ships contain components critical to ensuring the remaining in-
service ships have sufficient repair parts to meet today’s mission and reach their expected 
service life. Often, these parts may be expensive to procure, difficult or impossible to find 
on the market, or have an extremely long lead time for procurement. It may make sense 
to harvest these parts instead. Conversely, parts on the decommissioning ships may be 
expensive to harvest and repair or store on the shelf when they could be procured when 
needed or have a very low likelihood and consequence of failure. In this case, it would 
not make sense to harvest them. A need exists to understand further what parts harvesting 
is, the associated steps, and a process for determining if it is best to harvest a given part, 
procure the part, or neither.  
B. WHAT IS PARTS HARVESTING? 
Parts harvesting or reclamation involves removing material from a 
decommissioning asset (in this case, the Mine Countermeasure Avenger class surface 
ship) for re-use on in-service platforms prior to dismantling or scrapping operations. 
Removal of the installed equipment can be utilized to sustain operational assets and 
facilitates required material readiness that enables the MCM-1 class ships capable of 
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meeting all high-level functionality requirements. Depending on the scenario and risks, 
several instances of the harvesting of parts from a decommissioning asset can be a cost 
effective strategy to maintain in-service vessels to enable them to meet expected service 
life (ESL). Various considerations should be reviewed to determine whether a component 
should be harvested. Some include the number of in-service vessels that could utilize the 
harvested components, component mission criticality, number available in the Navy 
supply system, Navy supply system lead time of the component, and obsolescence. 
The challenge is to weigh the costs of equipment removal, refurbishment, 
warehousing, and shipping (components of parts harvesting) against scrapping and 
disposal of the same equipment. These tradeoffs are discussed further in the process and 
addressed in models provided in Appendix B. 
C. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
One of the most fundamental tools in systems engineering is to understand the 
functional requirements when trying to solve a problem. To that end, Figure 13 is a 
functional decomposition for the parts harvesting process. 
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Figure 13 (cont’d). Parts Harvesting Functional Decomposition 
 
 
The high-level functions to harvest parts off a surface ship are “determine 
harvesting needs,” “plan equipment removal,” “fund parts harvesting,” “remove 
equipment from decommissioning ship,” “store equipment (warehousing),” “ship 
equipment,” “document in Navy enterprise resource planning (ERP),” “refurbish 
harvested material,” “dispose of unnecessary components,” and “measure harvesting 
effectiveness.” While each of these functions is explained in further detail in Chapter IX, 
a brief overview follows. 
The “determine harvesting needs” top-level function is the means to document 
and plan on the components to be harvested from a ship to be dismantled. Six sub-
functions “determine harvesting needs.” The first sub-function is “review supportability 
data,” which entails a review of metrics, such as casualty reports (CASREPs), mean time 
between failure (MTBF), mean logistics downtime (MLDT), and obsolescence. The 
second sub-function is to “determine material challenges” to determine critical systems 
and/or components that currently or will in the future fail to meet operational availability 
(Ao) requirements. The third sub-function is to “determine sparing requirement,” which 
is a review of critical systems and required sparing to meet requirements. The fourth sub-
function is to “conduct ship check.” This function entails various subject matter experts 
(SMEs) visiting the ship to be dismantled to assess the condition of the equipment that 
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ideally would be harvested. The fifth sub-function is to “perform harvesting business case 
analysis (BCA)” to ensure the lowest cost means to support the ship systems, with respect 
to parts harvesting, is utilized. The sixth sub-function is to “consolidate inputs,” which 
integrates each stakeholder input into a single list. 
The “plan equipment removal” top-level function outlines the strategy that each 
entity will implement to remove components during harvesting operations. Four sub-
functions comprise “plan equipment removal.” The first sub-function is to “establish 
harvesting availability, which provides a period in time set aside specifically to 
accommodate parts harvesting operations. The second sub-function is to “plan ships force 
(SF) equipment removal.” This function outlines the strategy that SF will use to remove 
smaller components from the decommissioning ship. The third sub-function is to “plan 
government entity (GE) equipment removal.” This function outlines the strategy that the 
regional maintenance centers (RMCs) or in service engineering agent (ISEA) will use to 
harvest components. The fourth sub-function is “plan industrial activity (IA) equipment 
removal.” This function outlines the development of the work specification utilized by 
the contractor that will harvest critical components. 
The “fund parts harvesting” top-level function is the means to compensate for 
both planning and execution of parts harvesting operations. Three sub-functions comprise 
“fund parts harvesting.” The first sub-function is to “submit a program objective 
memorandum (POM) issue paper” to ensure adequate funds are in place to harvest parts 
off a ship during the window of opportunity just prior to the ship being dismantled. The 
second sub-function is to establish the contract vehicle utilized to fund the appropriate 
contractors to accomplish the harvesting operations. The third sub-function is to “fund 
planning and execution” of the harvesting operations. This function ensures that both the 
planners and the executing activities are paid for services rendered. 
The “remove equipment from decommissioning (DECOM) ship” top-level 
function is the process of actually physically removing components from the vessel. The 
“remove equipment from DECOM ship” function contains three sub-functions. The first 
sub-function is “SF remove equipment,” which consists of Navy Sailors physically 
removing equipment from the ship. The second sub-function is “GE remove equipment,” 
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which is government personnel removing equipment from a ship. The third sub-function 
is “industrial activity remove equipment.” This function involves government contractors 
removing equipment from a ship. 
The “store equipment (warehousing)” top-level function includes storing the 
harvested equipment immediately after removal from the ship, at a location awaiting 
repair (if applicable), and after equipment is restored (if applicable).  
The “ship equipment” top-level function consists of all packaging and shipping 
harvested components to the appropriate destination.  
The “document in Navy ERP system” top-level function is the process of ensuring 
harvested material is documented back into the Navy’s material system of record to 
ensure all entities can have visibility of available parts and condition. This process 
includes documenting both ready for issue (RFI) and non-RFI material. 
The “refurbish harvested equipment” top-level function encompasses the 
assessment and repair of equipment reclaimed from a DECOM ship. The “refurbish 
harvested equipment” function comprises three sub-functions. The first sub-function is 
“RMC refurbish equipment,” which entails the local U.S. Navy lead maintenance center 
shops to assess/repair harvested components. The second sub-function is “industrial 
activity refurbish equipment,” which necessitates that government contractors restore 
reclaimed material from a ship. The third sub-function is “government depot refurbish 
equipment,” at which government run facilities make required repairs to harvested 
equipment. 
The “dispose of unnecessary components” top-level function is the discarding of 
no longer needed components. This disposal can be due to a harvested component found 
to be beyond economical repair after assessment, an excess component required due to a 
higher percentage of assets harvested found to be able to be repaired than originally 
expected, or a component damaged during shipment to the point of rendering it useless. 
The final top-level function is to “measure harvesting effectiveness.” This 
function comprises three sub-functions. The first sub-function is “measure harvested 
parts usage,” which covers calculating which harvested parts have been put back into use 
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to meet a fleet need. The second sub-function is “measure Ao improvement.” This 
function determines if the parts harvested had any influence on system Ao. The third sub-
function is “measure cost avoidance,” which determines the amount of cost savings (if 
any) for parts harvesting. 
D. MCM-1 CLASS MATERIAL CHALLENGES 
MCM-1 Avenger class ships are designed to operate within both a mine danger 
area (MDA) and mine danger environment (MDE). Therefore, the ships must be 
“magnetically silent” to prevent being destroyed or severely damaged while conducting 
MIW operations due to magnetic influence and combined influence mines. For that 
reason, these ships’ hulls and structures are actually made of wood. The installed 
machinery utilizes components, to the greatest extent possible, that have a very low (less 
than 2.0) permeability (United States Navy Sea Systems Command 2003). This 
requirement means several of the onboard machinery components are non-magnetic. 
Getting repair parts from industry for the non-magnetic components is very difficult. In 
several cases, the production line was shut down several years ago, as the commercial 
companies were not seeing sufficient business to stock or even create the parts. Even 
within the U.S. Navy, only 11 remaining MCM-1 class ships use these components. An 
example of such a part is the lube oil (LO) purifier. Most U.S. Navy surface ships have a 
LO purifier onboard. However, only the MCM-1 class ships utilize a non-magnetic 
purifier bowl (just recently, the MCM class ships started replacing the LO purifier with a 
LO polisher). All the other ship classes help provide sufficient parts demand to the supply 
system that keeps industry incentivized to stock or make required LO purifier repair 
parts. The MCM-1 class parts demand for similar equipment is minimal in comparison. 
In some instances, even the reverse engineering of critical components has been required 
to keep an MCM operational. Reverse engineering of components is very time 
consuming and expensive in most cases. These challenges make it very difficult to 
maintain the MCM-1 class machinery and can cause lengthy repair timelines due to 
logistics delays.  
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E. SHIP DESIGN SINGLE POINT FAILURE CHALLENGES 
Further exacerbating the MCM-1 class repair parts challenges is, in some cases, 
the design of the ship. Typical U.S. Navy ships are designed to have redundant 
components to ensure the ship can meet operational commitments even with some of the 
equipment out of commission. MCM-1 class ships, on the other hand, were designed with 
various single point of failure (SPF) components. For example, one of the MIW tenants 
that an MCM must be able to perform is magnetic influence sweeping for mines, which 
entails towing a cable that actuates magnetic influence mines and disposes of them by 
explosion. Sweeping for mines is a quick way to clear a minefield for certain mine types. 
The AN/SLQ-37(V3) or “sweep” system onboard an MCM depends on the magnetic 
minesweep gas turbine generator (MMGTG), which consists of a single gas turbine and a 
generator (AC or DC dependent on hull number), minesweep switchboard, solid state 
pulse generator (SSPG), influence sweeping waveform generator, magnetic sweep cable 
reel, minesweeping winch, and the magnetic influencing sweeping cable (United States 
Navy Sea Systems Command 2003). Of the nine components previously listed, only the 
SSPGs contain a backup unit to perform the function. Everything else is in series and is a 
SPF. While somewhat simplified, peripheral equipment, such as the MMGTG LO cooler, 
cable fairleads, and roller chalks, are not included. All that material must work as well. 
This design makes it very difficult to obtain a highly reliable system. To that end, Ao is 
generally what leadership uses to gauge the system health, as the ability to repair the 
components quickly will still allow a ship to complete its tasking. Further examples of 
SPF on MCMs only increase the challenge of meeting platform level requirements.  
F. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT 
Ao is the primary means of readiness for U.S. Navy surface ship systems. The 
governing instruction regarding Ao is OPNAV INST 3000.12A, which includes the 
Operational Availability Handbook. The Ao concept is described as: 
Ao provides a measure of time or probability that a system’s capabilities 
will be available for operational use when needed. Ao is a critical, 
dominant element of the overall capability a system provides. It 
determines the real and sustainable capability that system users can 
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realistically achieve in an operational environment within planned 
resource levels. (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2003, 1) 
The equation for Ao is depicted as:  
Ao = MTBF / (MTBF + MTTR + MLDT) (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2003, 5) 
Operational Availability is the supportability calculation of the 
equipment/system (hardware & software) in terms of predicted Reliability 
(R) called Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and predicted 
Maintainability (M) in terms of Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) and 
designed supportability, called Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT). 
(Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2003, 4) 
The Ao requirement for the MCM-1 Avenger class ships is 75%. This 
requirement is outlined in the MCM-1 class Top Level Requirements:  
2.8.3 (U) Ship Operational Availability 
(U) The MCM ship operational availability is defined as the probability 
that the ship will be in a satisfactory operating condition to commence any 
of the mission phases shown in Fig. 2–1 at a random point in time. The 
ship and its mission equipment shall be designed to have a minimum 
average availability (A) of 0.75. (Department of the Navy Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations 1993, 26) 
The 75% Ao platform level objective is extremely important to understand when looking 
at reliability block diagrams (RBDs), which is discussed in further detail in Chapter IX of 
this report. Each system and system of systems must have sufficient Ao to meet the 
objectives. When platform Ao objectives are not being met, the RBDs make 
understanding the problem and where to apply resources much clearer.  
G. HARVESTING IMPORTANCE  
The benefit of harvesting material from MCM-1 class ships as they decommission 
is to help increase system Ao to meet the top-level requirement by decreasing logistic 
down time, addressing obsolescence issues when a component can no longer be 
purchased from commercial vendors and potential cost avoidance savings occur from 
procuring a more expensive new component. Harvesting components is a means to 
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ensure critical parts will be available for required repairs on the remaining in-service 
ships and minimize the MLDT component of the Ao equation: 
Ao = MTBF / (MTBF + MTTR + MLDT) 
The remaining in-service ships will be sustainable at a reasonable cost while meeting 
operational requirements. Neither will be possible without a process for making efficient 
use of components from dismantled, decommissioned ships. Further, using a systems 
engineering approach to harvest such parts off decommissioning MCMs provides 
resource sponsors the confidence that resources applied will have a significant return on 
investment, both financially and operationally, to result in a warship ready for tasking 
(WRFT). To know what material should be harvested, the risks of not harvesting the 
equipment must first be analyzed. Risk management entails answering five basic 
questions. 
 What can go wrong? 
 What is the probability the event will happen? 
 What are the consequences? 
 What can be done about it? 
 Is it affordable? 
To identify what can go wrong, this report utilized scenario-based risk identification 
techniques as they apply to a parts harvesting process, as seen in Figures 14 and 15.  
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Figure 14.  Scenario-Based Risk Identification–Repair and Maintain Scenarios 
 




Eight risk areas have been identified from Figures 14 and 15. One additional risk 
area not outlined in these figures is the risk of not accomplishing harvesting operations 
prior to the dismantling of an MCM (MCMs do not sit idle for years in INACTSHIPs the 
way the rest of the surface Navy typically does after decommissioning). Thus, nine risk 
areas are identified. Now that the risk areas have been identified, the consequence and 
likelihood must be reviewed and understood as outlined in Table 1 and Figure 16. It is 
worth noting that the consequence and likelihood are both on a scale of 1 to 5. A 
consequence of 1 would result in a very minor consequence while a 5 would result in 
challenges of the highest magnitude. A likelihood of 1 would have an extremely low 
probability of happening, while a likelihood of 5 would almost certainly happen.  
Table 1.   MCM Parts Harvesting Risks 
ID No. Activity  Consequence Likelihood
MCM-01 
If a ship is not properly funded for repairs, then 
it may not be able to meet its operational 
availability requirement 4 3 
MCM-02 
If parts have gone obsolete and there are not 
sufficient spares on the shelf or available for a 
lifetime buy prior to end of sale, then parts may 
fail with no replacement 4 4 
MCM-03 
If a part fails at a higher rate than accounted for 
in the PARM’s sparing plans , then there may 
not be sufficient spares available for ships to 
maintain their required Ao 4 2 
MCM-04 
If a ship’s life cycle maintenance actions are 
deferred or impacted due to planned 
decommission, then it may not maintain its 
required Ao 4 3 
MCM-05 
If failed part is unrepairable with no spare or 
purchase option, then it may have to be reverse 
engineered at a large cost and delay  4 4 
MCM-06 
If parts are not harvested from a ship during its 
parts harvesting window, then the opportunity 
for cost savings and improved availability may 
be missed  4 4 
MCM-07 
If LCS MIW mission package is delayed and 
MCM-1 class ships fail to meet Ao requirements 
then operational MIW needs may not be met 5 3 
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Figure 16.  MCM Parts Harvesting Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
 
MCM parts harvesting operations are a relatively cheap solution to sustaining the 
class and aid in mitigating the challenges and risks outlined previously. Having a process 
in place is necessary, as the ship will be dismantled shortly after decommissioning (parts 
will no longer be available for use after dismantling).  
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IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
This chapter analyzes the various characteristics of an MCM-1 class ship parts 
harvesting process. The concept of operations is vital for understanding the system 
boundaries, stakeholders, purpose, utilizations, assumptions, and constraints. The concept 
of operations also proves that parts harvesting is in fact executable, as it is already being 
accomplished in ad hoc fashion in the Surface Navy today.  
A. SYSTEM PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND 
In the past three years, the following ship classes have experienced various parts 
harvesting initiatives: frigates (FFG-7), cruisers (CG-47), Osprey-class coastal 
minehunters (MHC-51), and mine countermeasure (MCM-1) 
With that in mind, overarching instructions are currently not available for 
outlining the processes the Navy should use to remove parts effectively from ships slated 
for dismantling or simply available for scavenging to support the in-service fleet. Not 
surprisingly, various challenges were encountered during these projects. 
 “It is proposed that SEA 21 initiate an FFG 7 Class critical equipment 
harvesting program” (Glova 2013, 2). The presentation “proposed” SEA21 
lead the efforts because a document outlining which organization within 
the Navy is in charge of harvesting operations is not available. Harvesting 
operations outlined above have had different organizations lead the efforts. 
 “Use recently completed CG 47 Class equipment harvesting as a model” 
(Glova 2013, 2). In the absence of a documented procedure, a past 
“model” will be used with no guarantee that lessons learned will be 
applied or that an efficient process will be used. 
 “SEA 21 Leadership has not approved the funding or execution of the 
FFG harvesting proposal” (Glova 2013, 2). Harvesting operations need to 
be planned and resources allocated through the POM submission process 
when possible. 
 “Schedule: Funding required in May 2013 to initiate and execute a 
contract by September 2013 for equipment harvesting of ex-HAWES 
(FFG 53), which is designated for dismantling” (Glova 2013, 4). The lack 
of a documented procedure and plan can result in rushed evaluation of 
what equipment should be harvested. 
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 “Continue funding warehouse space of harvested material” (Stimson 2013, 
8). The harvesting of applicable MHC parts to support MCM-1 class ships 
required unplanned warehousing costs. 
The aforementioned topics are just a sampling of challenges experienced. A need 
exists for a repeatable parts harvesting procedure that effectively evaluates what 
components should be harvested, the removal and refurbishment of appropriate harvested 
equipment, the costs and benefits of harvesting, and the measures of effectiveness to 
ascertain if the need was met. The purpose of this paper is to develop and propose a 
procedure to fulfill the need. The procedure is developed utilizing system engineering 
processes and tools to ensure the process is executable and resource-efficient. The need 
for mine countermeasure capabilities, and specifically, sufficient repair parts, makes 
development and utilization of the parts harvesting procedure absolutely essential. 
B. LOCATION 
This thesis argues that the process developed should be incorporated into a 
NAVSEA instruction that covers the entire Surface Navy parts harvesting operations. 
Therefore, the physical location of the harvesting procedure should be on the NAVSEA 
instruction website (http://www.navsea.navy.mil/NAVSEAInstructions.aspx) in portable 
document format (PDF). This location was chosen based on which Navy organization 
should be the procedure owner. However, this location also includes the following 
benefits: 
 Open access that does not require a user login or common access card to 
open the file 
 Version control is facilitated (only the latest approved revision will be 
posted) 
 The website and data is backed up periodically 
Additionally, the source file for the PDF should be homed in a protected folder on 
either a NAVSEA network drive backed up periodically or a protected folder on the 
iNAVSEA website. Finally, both models in the Appendix should also be placed into 
version control and homed in the same location as the PDF’s source file.  
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C. ATTRIBUTES 
The harvesting procedure comprises a few attributes. The first is the procedure 
will consist of four electronic files, with date, and revision for version control. The 
published version file type should be in PDF format. The source file of the published 
instruction should be a word processing file, as it will facilitate instruction maintenance 
and periodic updating. The two files in the Appendix shall both be in Microsoft Excel 
format. NAVSEA Surface Ship Readiness and Sustainment Program office (PMS 443) 
will own the instruction and tools. 
D. PERFORMANCES AND UTILIZATIONS 
The harvesting procedure comprises various performances and utilizations. The 
procedure will provide guidance and support as follows: 
 Provides a defendable and repeatable process that supports infrequent 
MCM-1 class ship parts harvesting operations. 
 Assists system life cycle managers and other stakeholders in determining 
what equipment should be harvested. 
 Gives economical means to acquire additional repair parts for critical 
systems to meet Ao requirements and to reach ESL. 
 Outlines major steps and notional timeline to accomplish each task. 
 Accounts for periodic updating of the procedure. 
E. LIFE CYCLE OF PROBLEM 
The life cycle of the problem (build a procedure that facilitates effective parts 
harvesting of decommissioning MCM-1 class ships) dates from today until the last 
MCM-1 class ship is decommissioned, currently planned for year 2024. The procedure 
life cycle includes a design and development phase proposed in this thesis, a verification, 
and validation of the procedure following execution of the next parts harvesting operation 
that should commence in FY16 to support the execution in FY19. Following the first 
parts harvesting execution using this process, a feedback phase will be included to make 
appropriate procedure modifications based on lessons learned. This evolutionary process 
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will continue until the last MCM is dismantled or until this procedure is modified to 
include all surface ships.  
F. LIFE CYCLE OF NEED 
The life cycle of the need for a procedure to harvest parts off a decommissioning 
MCM-1 class ship to sustain the in-service or FMS customer ships is currently FY24. 
However, if this procedure were to be modified at a later date to include all surface ships, 
the life cycle of the need might be indefinite.  
G. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Various assumptions were made in the development of this procedure. Some of 
the major assumptions are as follows: 
 The problem (lack of procedure that facilitates effective parts harvesting 
of decommissioning MCM-1 class ships) is worthy of the resources 
required to solve. 
 The problem as stated previously is the correct problem to solve. 
 Parts harvesting will improve or help to maintain system operational 
availability. 
 Stakeholders will utilize the tools provided to determine which 
components should be harvested. 
 The resources (e.g., labor, equipment, time, money) required to execute 
this procedure will be available. 
 Harvesting operations integrated product team (IPT) members will be 
qualified and empowered to represent their organization or system(s). 
 The scope of the third party planning (3PP) contract will allow for work 
package development in support of harvesting operations availability. 
 NSWC Corona will be funded to build (RBDs for the MCM-1 class ships 
as part of the “sustainment-common operating picture” development that 
is currently in process with SEA21 oversight. 
 The RBDs will be static for the remainder of the MCM-1 class ships’ 
service life. 
 The RMC will customize availability milestones where required to support 
the parts harvesting availability, but will, at a minimum, conduct a work 
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package execution review (WPER) 30 days in advance of the availability 
in accordance with Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFMM) policy. 
 MCM-1 class ships will be dismantled shortly following decommissioning 
(less than six months later). 
This project also faces various constraints as well. The major constraints are the 
following: 
 Budget allocated to harvesting operations. 
 Time to harvest ship between last operational mission and ship 
dismantling (minimum time required is influenced both by the scope of 
harvesting operations and availability of resources required to execute the 
removal of equipment from the decommissioning ship). 
 Industrial activity (e.g., shipyards, repair contractors) workload and 
facility availability (drydocks). 
 SME availability during harvesting operations to oversee critical 
component removal. 
 Ships must be “tow-worthy” to facilitate movement to scrapping yard 
facility. 
 Part demand history is not consistently documented.  
H. TIMEFRAME 
The timeframe for this project is a total of three years (130 weeks). This project is 
divided into 10 major phases. The notional schedule is outlined in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Notional MCM-1 Class Parts Harvesting Operations Schedule 
Phase Task Task Wks Total Wks
Months from 
harvest avail start Notes 
Determine 
Harvesting 
Needs     16A-30 
 Harvesting manager should evaluate if the process should start even sooner 
based on when the harvesting availability will occur and meeting the POM 




Corona created RBD 
via S-COP efforts) 1      
  Perform FTA 2      
  
Determine Critical 
Parts 1      
  
Determine Sparing 
Reqs 1      
  
Determine Current 
Stock 1      
  
Determine Number 
Needed 1      
  
Identify Number 
Avail to Purchase 
and Cost 3      
  
Identify Number 
Avail to Harvest and 
Cost 1      
  
Perform 
Optimization 1      
  
Consolidate SH 
Inputs Into Single 
Spreadsheet 3      
  
Shipchecks (if 
applicable) 1      
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Phase Task Task Wks Total Wks
Months from 
harvest avail start Notes 
Plan Equipment 
Removal     8A-26   
  
Plan SF equipment 
removal (does not 
count against task 
timeline as it does 
not require a POM 
issue paper) 2      
  
Plan RMC 
equipment removal 4      
  
Plan IA equipment 
removal to include 
estimating efforts 
(NOTE: estimate 
required for POM 
issue paper 
submittal) 8      
Fund Parts 
Harvesting     36A-24   
  
Submit POM issue 






award) 36      
  
Fund 
Planning/Execution 2      
Remove 
Equipment from 
DECOM ship       A-0   
  
SF Remove 
Equipment   25    
 46
Phase Task Task Wks Total Wks
Months from 
harvest avail start Notes 
  
RMC Remove 




(Repair contractor) 12      
  
Transit from Repair 
Contractor Facility 





contractor) 10      
Store Equipment       A+6   
  Store RFI Equipment 
Life of 





system     Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
Ship Equipment         Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
  Ship Equip to WH 1    Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
  
Ship Equipment to 
Repair Facility 1    Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
Document in 
ERP   4    Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
Refurbish 
Harvested 
Equipment           
  RMC Refurb Equip Varies     Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
  IA Refurb Equip Varies     Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
  
Gov”t Depot Refurb 
Equip Varies     Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
Dispose 
Unnecessary   Varies     Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
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Phase Task Task Wks Total Wks
Months from 




Effectiveness   Varies     Timeline not critical to removal of equipment prior to dismantling 
      
 Project Total 85  
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I. SYSTEM BOUNDARIES 
It is important to define the boundaries of the system. The boundaries of the 
process begin with a MCM-1 class ship being slated for decommissioning and 
dismantling. As the process continues, the boundaries include those with the various 
stakeholders, users, and customers of the process. The process cannot direct any of these 
stakeholders to utilize the process; it is simply a tool available to the decision makers.  
With respect to funding, this process outlines a single entity (PMS 443) to submit 
a POM issue paper for all equipment removal in support of the parts harvesting effort. 
However, while this procedure discusses the need to refurbish the equipment harvested, 
the funding for harvested component refurbishment would be outside the system 
boundaries. Each PARM or fleet would be responsible for component refurbishment.  
Further, the parts harvesting procedure is not attempting to re-write guidance 
where existing instructions already apply. For example, the JFMM already outlines the 
various stakeholder roles and responsibilities for availability execution, as well as major 
availability milestones. This procedure acknowledges the function must be performed but 
will only provide guidance where required to facilitate the parts harvesting operation and 
account for major differences from the normal operating procedures.  
Finally, at the other end of the process, is the boundary at which the part is 
entered into ERP and refurbished. Once the equipment is at this point, the standard Navy 
supply system sparing processes take over. Additionally, once a part is identified for 
disposal, the disposal process for that part is initiated and is no longer part of the 
harvesting procedure system.  
J. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
A matrix of the identified stakeholders with impact area is shown in Table 3. This 
matrix includes stakeholders and impact area to the harvesting process via appropriate 
top-level function.  
 49
Table 3.   Stakeholder Matrix 
Stakeholders 























MARAD                   X 
USCG                   X 
MCMRON 3, 5, 7 X   X X         X   
Maintenance Team X     X X       X   
Port Engineer X   X           X   
RMC Project Manager (PM) X   X X X X X   X   
In-service MCM ship crews X   X X   X X   X   
NSWCs X   X   X X X   X   
NSWC Corona X             X X   
SPAWAR  X X X X X X X X X   
SEA21 X X X X X X   X X   
SEA21I   X      X X 
SEA05 (DFSs) TWHs X   X   X X X X X   
CNSP/CNSL (Surface 
Forces Type Commander) X X X X X X X X X   
C3F, C5F, C7F                   X 
NAVSUP X       X X X X X   
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Stakeholders 























DLA X       X X X X X   
OPNAV N95   X           X X   
Participating Acquisition 
Manager (PARM) X X X X X X X X X   
RMCs   X X X X X X   X   
NAVSEA PMS 326 (FMS) X X     X X X   X X 
Repair Shipyards     X X X X X   X   
Ship-breaking Shipyards     X X   X X   X   
3PP contractor     X X         X   
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A stakeholder analysis is a critical tool that aids in understanding stakeholder 
needs with respect to a given project. Understanding stakeholder roles and needs also 
helps to identify impacts to a project based on these needs. Some of the major 
stakeholders for MCM sustainment, and more specifically, MCM parts harvesting 
operations are the following. 
1. Department of Transportation—Maritime Administration  
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) role is described as: 
Promote the development and maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced 
United States merchant marine, sufficient to carry the Nation’s domestic 
waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its waterborne foreign 
commerce, and capable of service as a naval and military auxiliary in time 
of war or national emergency. The Maritime Administration also seeks to 
ensure that the United States maintains adequate shipbuilding and repair 
services, efficient ports, effective inter-modal water and land 
transportation systems, and reserve shipping capacity for use in time of 
national emergency. (U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime 
Administration 2015) 
Both in peace and war, MARAD needs the U.S. Navy to keep waterways open for 
commercial traffic. A critical component of this need is the ability to deter and respond to 
enemy MIW tactics or practices utilizing the MCM-1 class ships.  
2. Department of Homeland Security—U.S. Coast Guard 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has 11 separate mission areas in their 
roles with Department of Homeland Security and Defense. The USCG needs mine-free 
waterways to fulfill the missions successfully: ports, waterways, and coastal security, 
drug interdiction, aids to navigation, search and rescue, living marine resources, marine 
safety, defense readiness, migrant interdiction, marine environmental protection, ice 
operations, and other law enforcement (United States Coast Guard 2015). 
3. Department of Defense—Mine Countermeasure Squadrons 
(MCMRONs) 3, 5, and 7  
MCMRONs act as the Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC), as delegated by 
the Type Commander (TYCOM), to ensure all ships under their cognizance are properly 
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manned, trained, and equipped to fulfill MIW missions. To accomplish this role, 
MCMRONs need fully functional MCM-1 class ships with highly trained crews that can 
respond to Combatant Commander (COCOM) MIW requirements. Further, MCMRONs 
need to provide fleet input when determining parts harvesting needs.  
4. Maintenance Team 
The maintenance team (MT) is the direct interface with SF to ensure the 
appropriate maintenance is being accomplished to keep the ship at the highest state of 
material readiness possible within operational and budgetary constraints. As per the 
JFMM, “The primary responsibility of the Maintenance Team is to manage the advanced 
planning and planning of the maintenance and modernization process in accordance with 
the maintenance policies, directives and business rules of the Fleet Commander, TYCOM 
and the Naval Supervisory Authority (NSA)” (Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command 
2013, VI-41–3). To fulfill these roles, the MT needs procedural compliance with 
maintenance requirements and contracts, as well as appropriate spare parts to plan, 
execute, and provide quality assurance that work was accomplished in accordance with 
all standards for both planned and unplanned maintenance actions on U.S. Navy surface 
ships. 
5. Port Engineer 
The ship’s port engineer (PE) “validates, screens and assigns all maintenance and 
modernization, including assessments, requiring off ship assistance. Ensures the Program 
Manager (PM) has visibility of all assigned work. For all combat systems related 
maintenance and modernization the Ashore Ship’s Maintenance Manager (PE) will 
coordinate with the Combat Systems Port Engineer” (Commander U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command 2013, VI-41–1). The PE needs appropriate parts to ensure repairs can be made 
to shipboard equipment. 
6. RMC Project Manager  
The ship’s project manager “leads the project team (PT), including the 
Maintenance Team members, during the maintenance availabilities. Acts as the 
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availability management team point of contact for outside agencies seeking information 
relating to the project, the contractor’s performance or technical issues under review” 
(Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command 2013, VI-41–9). The PM needs to manage the 
parts harvesting availability on behalf of the RMC. 
7. In-Service MCM Ship Crews 
The role of the in-service MCM ship crews is to operate and maintain the MCM 
platform to perform MIW operations as directed by the ISIC. The crews need materially 
sound vessels that operate as per design. Further, they need to document adequately all 
material deficiencies to ensure 1) appropriate off-ship assistance can be provided (if 
required), and 2) order repair parts to support required repairs.  
8. Naval Surface Warfare Centers  
The Naval Surface Warfare Centers’ (NSWCs) role is: 
Supply the technical operations, people, technology, engineering services 
and products needed to equip and support the fleet and meet the 
warfighters” needs. The Warfare Centers are the Navy’s principal 
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) assessment activity 
for surface ship and submarine systems and subsystems. In addition, the 
Warfare Centers provide depot maintenance and in-service engineering 
support to ensure the systems fielded today perform consistently and 
reliably in the future. (Naval Sea Systems Command 2015b) 
The NSWCs need fleet feedback as to how the systems are operating to determine the 
best method of providing support to ensure systems are designed appropriately and will 
meet expected service life in the most economical means possible. Further, ISEAs that 
work for the NSWC’s need to provide input on their specific system(s) when developing 
parts harvesting requirements.  
9. NSWC Corona 
NSWC Corona tracks and maintains the metrics for the surface Navy that 
articulate material condition. These metrics include Ao, MTBF, MLDT, mean time to 
repair (MTTR) among others. NSWC Corona’s role is: 
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Using a rigorous, disciplined independent assessment process, Corona 
provides the fleet, program managers and acquisition community with the 
objective assessment needed for the Navy to gauge warfighting capability 
of ships and aircraft, assess warfare training and analyze new defense 
systems—even those systems in the concept phase. This commitment to 
independent assessment allows the Navy to achieve the greatest value for 
acquisition, material readiness and life cycle management programs—for 
Today’s Navy, the Next Navy, and the Navy After Next. (Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2015b) 
NSWC Corona needs to provide metrics that clearly articulate the surface ship 
sustainment measures of effectiveness.  
10. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command  
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) strategic 
plan describes the command as 
the Navy’s Information Dominance Systems Command providing 
capabilities in the fields of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 
cyber warfare; command and control; information and knowledge 
management; communication systems; and enabling technologies 
including meteorology and oceanography. SPAWAR programs and 
projects cover the full life cycle from research and development, system-
of-systems engineering, test and evaluation, acquisition, installations and 
in-service support. SPAWAR works closely with the fleet, systems 
commands, and Navy partners to deliver capability seamlessly and 
effectively by acquiring and/or integrating sensors, communications, 
weapons, information and control systems for existing and future ships, 
aircraft, submarines, and unmanned systems. (Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (SPAWAR) 2012, 2) 
SPAWAR needs fleet feedback as to how the systems are operating to determine 
the best method of providing support or system modernization to ensure systems operate 
as per design and will meet expected service life in the most economical means possible. 
Further, ISEAs who work for SPAWAR need to provide input on their specific system(s) 




11. NAVSEA 21 
The official NAVSEA website states: 
NAVSEA 21 is the dedicated life cycle management organization for the 
Navy’s in-service surface ships and is responsible for managing critical 
modernization, maintenance, training, and inactivation programs. SEA 21 
provides wholeness to the fleet by serving as the primary technical 
interface to ensure surface ships are modernized with the latest 
technologies and remain mission relevant throughout each ship’s service 
life. The organization also maintains inactive ships for future disposal, 
donation, or transfer, to include follow-on technical support to our partner 
navies. (Naval Sea Systems Command 2015c) 
SEA21 needs feedback from the fleet to ensure systems life cycle management 
can be accomplished. To ensure the ships remain mission relevant during their service 
life, they need to understand which parts are SPF, the component mission criticality, and 
actively managed obsolescence challenges throughout the surface fleet. 
12. Navy Inactive Ships Office  
The Navy Inactive Ships Office (NAVSEA 21I) is the division within NAVSEA 
21 that takes control of a Navy surface ship following decommission.  
According to the NAVSEA official website, “The Navy Inactive Ships Office 
(SEA 21I) manages U.S. Navy ships and craft that have reached the natural end of their 
life cycle. SEA 21I is responsible for the planning, programming, budgeting, and 
execution of the Navy’s inactivation and disposal of conventionally powered surface 
ships and craft” (Naval Sea Systems Command 2015d).  
NAVSEA 21I needs harvesting stakeholders to adhere to 1) Naval Ships 
Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 050, Readiness and Care of Inactive Ships Revision 
3, 2) the U.S. Navy Towing Manual (Technical Manual # SL740-AA-MAN-010, 
Revision 3, and 3) OPNAV Instruction 4770.5H, Inactivation, Retirement, and 
Disposition of U.S. Naval Vessels during harvesting operations.  
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13. NAVSEA 05 
“The Naval Systems Engineering Directorate (SEA05) is responsible for 
providing the engineering and scientific expertise, knowledge, and technical authority 
necessary to design, build, maintain, repair, modernize, certify, and dispose of the Navy’s 
ships, submarines, and associated warfare systems” (Naval Sea Systems Command 
2015a). SEA 05 TWHs need to minimize the number of technical departure from 
specifications (DFSs) that exist on ships due to a lack of available technically acceptable 
(i.e., shock qualified, vibration certified) repair parts and that ships are being maintained 
while adhering to all appropriate technical requirements.  
14. Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific/Commander Naval Surface 
Forces Atlantic 
Both Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific/Atlantic are the Surface Navy 
TYCOM). The TYCOMs provide “Combat Commanders with lethal, ready, well-trained, 
and logistically-supported Surface Forces to assure, deter and win” (Commander Naval 
Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Atlantic 
Fleet 2015, 4). The TYCOMs need to have appropriate maintenance replacement parts to 
ensure Naval surface ships can logistically support having WRFT. 
15. Combatant Commanders  
COCOMs are responsible for their area of responsibility (AORs) with a role to 
“protect and defend, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the territory of the 
United States, its people, and its interests.” This responsibility is accomplished “by 
promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to 
contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach 
is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness” (U.S. Pacific Command 2015). 
COCOMs need to have materially sound ships prepared to conduct missions to protect 
U.S. territories and interests. 
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16. Naval Supply Systems Command  
Naval Supply Systems Command’s (NAVSUP’s) role is: 
To deliver sustained global logistics and quality-of-life support to the 
Navy and Joint warfighter.” NAVSUP provides “responsive and agile 
support through a myriad of actions and responsibilities, including 
material management, acquisition and positioning, husbanding support, 
services contracting, ammunition, fuel, uniforms, food, integrated 
logistics, mail, NEX, Navy Lodge, and more. (Naval Supply Systems 
Command 2015, 3) 
NAVSUP needs clear demand history of all parts purchased to sustain MCM-1 class 
ships. This demand history is critical to ensuring appropriate stocking levels can be met 
based on fleet usage. If SF or contracted repair facilities procure parts for maintenance 
outside of the Naval Supply system, a demand-only requisition needs to be submitted to 
ensure demand is captured. Policy adherence is critical to preventing situations in which 
inaccurate component requirements lead to the part no longer being stocked by 
NAVSUP. 
17. Defense Logistics Agency  
The Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA’s) role is: 
…provides the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, other federal 
agencies, and combined and allied forces with the full spectrum of 
logistics, acquisition and technical services. The Agency sources and 
provides nearly 100 percent of the consumable items America’s military 
forces need to operate, from food, fuel and energy, to uniforms, medical 
supplies, and construction and barrier equipment. DLA also supplies more 
than 85 percent of the military’s spare parts. In addition, the Agency 
manages the reutilization of military equipment, provides catalogs and 
other logistics information products, and offers document automation and 
production services. (Defense Logistics Agency 2015) 
DLA needs clear demand history of all parts purchased to sustain MCM-1 class 
ships. This demand history is critical to ensuring appropriate stocking levels can be met 
based on fleet usage. If SF or contracted repair facilities procure parts under DLA 
cognizance for maintenance outside of the DLA managed supply system, a demand-only 
requisition needs to be submitted to ensure demand is captured. Policy adherence is 
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critical to preventing situations in which inaccurate component requirements lead to the 
part no longer being stocked by DLA.  
18. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N95) is the Navy’s resource sponsor for 
expeditionary warfare. The organization establishes requirements, sets priorities, and 
directs overall planning and programming for expeditionary warfare systems and related 
manpower, training, and readiness. Specifically, the directorate oversees manpower, 
training, procurement, sustainment, and R&D appropriates for the Naval Special Warfare, 
Mine Warfare, Amphibious Warfare, Navy Expeditionary Combat and Maritime 
Preposition Forces (Dawnbreaker Inc. 2013, 1).  
N95 needs a clear and complete list of requirements to support MCM-1 class 
ships to ensure they have adequate resources to fulfill their missions. 
19. Participating Acquisition Manager  
The participating acquisition manager (PARM) consists of “Activities tasked and 
funded with the responsibility for providing government furnished equipment (GFE), 
Government Furnished Information (GFI), or engineering data to support ship 
acquisition/modernization or system/equipment acquisition programs” (Commander 
Naval Sea Systems Command 1990, 2–2). The term “PARM” does not appear to be 
consistently used throughout the Navy. Therefore, the PARM could also be the system 
program manager authorized representative. For the remainder of this thesis, the 
“PARM” is referred to as the individual responsible for a given system’s life cycle 
management. The PARM needs to understand what parts support is required for a system 
to meet both Ao requirements and to reach ESL. 
20. Regional Maintenance Centers 
The RMCs are the first responders to fleet maintenance requirements. The RMCs 
are “the command with overall responsibility for efficient planning, brokering and 
execution of all ship maintenance and modernization for assigned ships is the local RMC. 
The RMC is a subordinate command to the Fleet Commander” (U.S. Fleet Forces 
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Command 2013, II-II-1–1). RMCs need to manage and execute the parts harvesting 
availabilities. With respect to components that the RMC will harvest and refurbish from a 
ship, the RMCs need to plan for this work. 
21. NAVSEA PMS 326  
The NAVSEA PMS 326 foreign military sales (FMS) program office provides 
support to ships that have been sold via foreign military sales. The PMS 326 mission is to 
manage execution of FMS cases that require further support through the ships’ life cycle. 
FMS needs to identify parts that their customers would like to harvest and provide 
funding for component removal accordingly as opportunities present themselves. 
a. Commercial Shipyards 
Two different types of shipyards might be stakeholders in the parts harvesting 
operations. The first is repair shipyards that conduct vital repairs on U.S. Navy ships on a 
daily basis. The repair shipyards need to provide a service (ship repair) to make money. 
The second type is ship-breaking shipyards that dismantle and scrap U.S. Navy ships. 
The ship-breaking shipyards also need to provide a service, as well as sell/recycle 
stripped material to make money.  
b. Third Party Advanced Planning Contractor 
The 3PP contractor is responsible for planning all work regarding surface ship 
maintenance and modernization. This contract is currently being solicited as the Navy 
transitions these planning duties from the current multi-ship-multi-option (MSMO) 
contractor. The 3PP contractor needs to develop work specifications that will facilitate 
parts harvesting maintenance availabilities and provide detailed cost estimates for the 
parts harvesting efforts (Naval Sea Systems Command 2014, 30). 
Table 4 summarizes all stakeholders and their respective needs. The purpose for 
the identification of stakeholders and their needs is to assure that the requirements 
defined and derived for the solution to the problem satisfy the needs of the stakeholders. 
In effect, this satisfaction of needs is a compliance issue in systems engineering.  
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Table 4.   Stakeholder Needs Analysis 
STAKEHOLDER Need 
MARAD 
MARAD needs the U.S. Navy to keep waterways open for 
commercial traffic. A critical component of this need is the ability 
to deter and respond to enemy MIW tactics or practices utilizing 
the MCM-1 class ships.  
USCG The USCG needs mine-free waterways to fulfill their various roles successfully. 
MCMRON 3, 5, 7 
Fully functional MCM-1 class ships with highly trained crews that 
can respond to COCOM MIW requirements. Further, MCMRONs 
need to provide fleet input when determining parts harvesting 
needs.  
Maintenance Team 
Procedural compliance with maintenance requirements, as well as 
appropriate spare parts to conduct both planned and unplanned 
maintenance actions. 
Port Engineer The PE needs appropriate parts to ensure repairs can be made to shipboard equipment. 
RMC Project 
Manager  
The RMC project manager needs to manage the parts harvesting 
availability on behalf of the RMC. 
In-service MCM 
ship crews Materially sound vessels that operate as per design. 
NSWCs 
The NSWCs need fleet feedback as to how the systems are 
operating to determine the best method of providing support or 
system modernization to ensure systems operate as per design and 
will meet expected service life in the most economical means 
possible. Further, ISEAs who work for the NSWCs need to 
provide input on their specific system(s) when developing parts 
harvesting requirements. Last, the NSWCs need to ensure all 
harvested material is placed in the Navy ERP for visibility by all 
applicable entities. 
NSWC Corona NSWC Corona needs to provide metrics that clearly articulate the surface ship sustainment measures of effectiveness.  
SPAWAR 
SPAWAR needs fleet feedback as to how the systems are 
operating to determine the best method of providing support or 
system modernization to ensure systems operate as per design and 
will meet expected service life in the most economical means 
possible. Further, ISEAs who work for SPAWAR need to provide 
input on their specific system(s) when developing parts harvesting 
requirements. Last, SPAWAR needs to ensure all harvested 










SEA21 needs feedback from the fleet to ensure systems life cycle 
management can be accomplished. In particular, they need to 
understand which parts are SPF, the component mission criticality, 
and actively managed obsolescence challenges throughout the 
surface fleet. 
SEA21I 
NAVSEA 21I needs harvesting stakeholders to adhere to 1) Naval 
Ships’ Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 050, Readiness and 
Care of Inactive Ships Revision 3, 2) the U.S. Navy Towing 
Manual (Technical Manual # SL740-AA-MAN-010, Revision 3, 
and 3) OPNAV instruction 4770.5H, Inactivation, Retirement, and 
Disposition of U.S. Naval Vessels during harvesting operations.  
SEA05 (DFSs) 
TWHs 
SEA 05 technical warrant holders (TWHs) need to minimize the 
number of technical DFSs that exist on ships due to lack of 
available technically acceptable (shock qualified, vibration 




The TYCOMs need to have appropriate replacement parts to 
ensure Naval surface ships can logistically support having WRFT. 
C3F, C5F, C7F COCOMs need to have materially sound ships prepared to conduct missions to protect U.S. interests. 
NAVSUP 
NAVSUP needs clear demand history of all parts purchased in 
order to sustain MCM-1 class ships. This demand history is 
critical to ensuring appropriate stocking levels can be met based 
on fleet usage. If SF or contracted repair facilities procure parts for 
maintenance outside of the Naval Supply system, a demand-only 
requisition needs to be submitted to ensure demand is captured. 
Policy adherence is critical to preventing situations in which 
inaccurate component requirements lead to the part no longer 
being stocked by NAVSUP. 
DLA 
DLA needs clear demand history of all parts purchased to sustain 
MCM-1 class ships. This demand history is critical to ensuring 
appropriate stocking levels can be met based on fleet usage. If SF 
or contracted repair facilities procure parts under DLA cognizance 
for maintenance outside of the DLA managed supply system, a 
demand-only requisition needs to be submitted to ensure demand 
is captured. Policy adherence is critical to preventing situations in 
which inaccurate component requirements lead to the part no 
longer being stocked by DLA. 
OPNAV N95 
N95 needs clear and a complete list of requirements to support 
MCM-1 class ships to ensure they have adequate resources to 
fulfill their missions. 
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The PARM needs to understand what parts support is required for 
a system to meet both Ao requirements and to reach expected 
service life ESL. 
RMCs RMCs need to manage and execute the parts harvesting availabilities. 
NAVSEA PMS 
326 (FMS) 
FMS needs to identify parts that their customers would like to 
harvest and provide funding for component removal accordingly, 
as opportunities present themselves. 
Repair Shipyards The repair shipyards need to provide a service (ship repair) to make money.  
Ship-breaking 
Shipyards 
The ship-breaking shipyards also need to provide a service, as well 
as sell/recycle stripped material to make money.  
3PP contractor 
The 3PP contractor needs to develop work specifications that will 
facilitate parts harvesting maintenance availabilities and provide 
detailed cost estimates for the parts harvesting efforts (Naval Sea 




The customers of the parts harvesting process include NAVSEA PMS 443 and 
any stakeholder providing funding towards the parts harvesting operations. The funding 
stakeholders could include SPAWAR, FMS, various NAVSEA program offices, and the 
TYCOM. 
L. USERS 
The parts harvesting procedure has several users. As per the stakeholder matrix in 
Table 4, all stakeholders with the exception of MARAD, USCG, and the fleet 
commanders (C3F, C5F, C7F), are users of the parts harvesting procedure. 
M. TOP-LEVEL USE CASES 
The top-level use cases capture the contract between the stakeholders of a system 
and the system’s behaviors. Use cases provide a means of capturing the flow of functions 
that must be carried out to satisfy a set of requirements. Since the functions have 
measurable performance(s), the use case provides an end-to-end way of evaluating the 
 63
efficacy of a proposed implementation of work effort to accomplish what stakeholders 
need. The use case will start with a single stakeholder called the primary actor and 
describe the system’s behaviors based on inputs from the primary actor. While the 
primary actor interacts with the system towards an end goal, the system must respond, 
while still protecting the other stakeholders’ interests (Cockburn 2001). The use cases for 
this parts harvesting process are as follows.  
1. Use Case 1: Implement Process 
Primary Actor: NAVSEA PMS 443 
Scope: NAVSEA PMS 443 defines the process as a directive for use by parts 
harvesting customers and users. 
Stakeholders and Interests: NAVSEA PMS 443 wants to have a defined process 
for coordinated decisions on parts harvesting needs.  
Precondition: The process is defined and documented in the NAVSEA instruction 
format. 
Minimal Guarantee: NAVSEA PMS 443 provides guidance for this process to be 
followed.  
Success Guarantee: The documented process and related tools are posted to 
NAVSEA instruction website and used each time a MCM-1 class ship is identified for 
decommissioning/dismantling.  
Trigger: NAVSEA PMS 443 releases naval message with guidance for use of the 
process.  
Main Success Scenario:  
1. NAVSEA PMS 443 identifies the process as a standard to be followed. 
2. The process document is placed under CM control by PMS 443 and posted 
to the NAVSEA instruction website for use.  
3. NAVSEA PMS 443 sends a naval message to all users and customer 
stakeholders to adhere to this process for all future decommissioning of 
MCM-1 class ships.  
Extensions:  
1. PMS 443 adopts the policy but does not advertise and direct its use. 
a.  The policy is not consistently used or followed. 
2. The process document is not placed under CM or put on the NAVSEA 
instruction website.  
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a.  Various versions start being circulated and users are confused or 
following incorrect guidance. 
b  Users do not follow the process because they did not know where 
to find it. 
2a.3  Process is lost due to an individual machine failure that is 
not backed up like the NAVSEA instruction website. 
 
 
3a.  PMS 443 fails to transmit guidance that this process will be used for all 
follow-on MCM-1 class decommissions. 
3a.1  The process is not utilized each time a MCM is 
decommissioned resulting in less than optimal critical parts 
harvesting operations. 
2. Use Case 2: Follow Process 
Primary Actor: NAVSEA PMS 443Harvesting Manager 
Scope: Harvesting manager follows the process, interacting with the key users, 
customers and stakeholders along the way. 
Stakeholders and Interests: See Table 3 for list of stakeholders and needs.  
Precondition: Success of use case 1. 
Minimal Guarantee: Harvesting manager kicks off the process. 
Success Guarantee: The process is followed start to finish and the optimal parts 
required are harvested, improving MCM-1 class ships’ sustainment.  
Trigger: MCM-1 class ship is identified for decommissioning/dismantling. 
Main success Scenario:  
1. Harvesting manager kicks off the process by contacting the PARMs via 
Naval Message and IPT kick-off meeting. 
2. The process is successfully followed.  
3. The optimal parts required are harvested, improving MCM-1 class ships’ 
sustainment. 
Extensions:  
1a.  Process users do not properly react to the trigger. 
1a1.  The process is not followed. 
1b.  The harvesting manager only notifies a portion of the PARMs/end users. 
1b1.  Only a portion of the critical parts benefit from the process. 
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2a.  The process is not properly executed. 
2a1.  The optimal number of parts are not harvested. 
2a2.  Cost is not minimized. 
2a3.  Remaining MCM-1 class ships do not benefit from improved 
sustainability. 
2a4.  Harvested parts are not properly shipped, repaired, stored, or 
disposed. 
2a5.  The ERP system is not properly updated to reflect harvested parts.  
3. Use Case 3: Update/Modify Process 
Primary Actor: NAVSEA PMS 443 
Scope: NAVSEA PMS 443 modifies the process. 
Stakeholders and Interests: NAVSEA PMS 443 desires modifying the process 
based on experience, lessons learned, and feedback from other stakeholders.  
Precondition: Use case 1. 
Minimal Guarantee: NAVSEA PMS 443 modifies the process.  
Success Guarantee: The documented process is modified under CM controls and 
the updated process is followed going forward.  
Trigger: NAVSEA PMS 443 determines modifications to the process are 
necessary following parts harvesting operations.  
Main success Scenario:  
1. NAVSEA PMS 443 identifies updates to the current process with 
stakeholder inputs.  
2. The process document and related tools, under CM control are updated 
and the new process is made available for use.  
Extensions:  
2a.  The desired changes are not properly made in the process documentation.  
2a1.  The updated process is not followed. 
2b.  The users do not retrieve the updated process from the NAVSEA 
instruction website. 
2b1.  The updated process is not followed. 
4. Use Case 4: Discontinued Use 
Primary Actor: NAVSEA PMS 443 
Scope: NAVSEA PMS 443 decides to no longer adhere to the process. 
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Stakeholders and Interests: NAVSEA PMS 443 has decided no longer to follow 
the process due to any number of factors, such as lack of buy-in and support by 
stakeholders, all funding for sustainment of any sort (including harvesting) is cut, or all 
critical parts are determined to have enough spares on the shelf for the remaining life of 
the ship class.  
Precondition: Use case 1. 
Minimal Guarantee: NAVSEA PMS 443 provides guidance for this process to no 
longer be followed.  
Success Guarantee: The documented process and related tools are removed from 
the NAVSEA instruction website or noted as obsolete.  
Trigger: NAVSEA PMS 443 releases naval message with guidance for 
discontinued use of the process.  
Main success Scenario:  
1. NAVSEA PMS 443 determines the process is no longer to be followed.  
2. The process document and related tools are removed from the NAVSEA 
instruction website or marked as obsolete.  
3. NAVSEA PMS 443 sends a Naval message to all process users and 
customers to discontinue use of the process. 
Extensions:  
2a.  The process and tools are not removed or clearly marked for discontinued 
use. 
2a1.  The process continues to be followed. 
2b. NAVSEA PMS 443 does not send the message or process users and customers 
do not receive the message. 
2b1.  The process continues to be followed. 
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V. CONCEPTUALIZATION 
Several options for a process in determining which parts, and how many, to 
harvest from a decommissioning ship were considered. These options are summarized as 
follows: 
 Use consistency across parts and ships—always harvest all parts or never 
harvest any. 
 This option was quickly dismissed because it does not meet a 
number of requirements, such as minimizing cost. 
 Continue ad hoc process—react each time a ship begins its 
decommissioning by pulling a small team together and using their best 
effort to decide which parts seem like strong candidates for harvesting. 
 This option was also dismissed because, while an improvement 
from option 1, this option also does not meet a number of 
requirements or maximize the benefits of a well-defined process. 
 Utilize the systems engineering process properly to define a parts 
harvesting process that is structured and inclusive of all parts and 
stakeholders but also dynamic over time.  
 Ultimately, this option was selected and documented herein.  
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VI. SELECTION OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
MODEL 
The evolutionary systems engineering process model is used for the parts 
harvesting procedure development. The evolutionary systems engineering process is used 
because the procedure requires periodic updates to keep it relevant. Two types of updates 
are available. The first is technical updates where something in the procedure is 
technically incorrect or it is possible to accomplish a given task by better means. The 
second is administrative changes that could include items, such as a program office code 
designator change. The evolutionary systems engineering process model for parts 
harvesting procedure development is depicted in Figure 17. 
Figure 17.  Parts Harvesting Development Evolutionary Model 
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VII. PARTS HARVESTING PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 
Following review of the stakeholder analysis and their needs, it is logical to define 
the process requirements. The requirements for the parts harvesting process can be found 
in Table 5.  
Table 5.   Parts Harvesting Process Requirements 
UID Requirement Type 
1.0 The process shall define the steps for performing parts harvesting Requirement
1.1 The process shall identify critical components Decomposed
1.2 The process shall define steps for determining the number of spares required Decomposed
1.3 The process shall define the steps for optimized decision to procure or harvest needed spares Decomposed
1.4 The process shall have a feedback loop to update the supply system with results of parts harvesting Decomposed
1.5 The process shall provide steps for disposal of parts harvested but no longer required Decomposed
2.0 The process shall minimize cost with a systems optimization model Requirement
3.0 The process shall maintain current or improve MLDT of the MCM Requirement
4.0 The process shall adhere to all applicable contractual and maintenance standards Requirement
5.0 The process shall identify the roles and responsibilities of the parts harvesting stakeholders Requirement
6.0 There shall exist a means of configuration management for the process Requirement
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VIII. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The development of a parts harvesting procedure for DECOM MCM-1 class ships 
requires a thorough understanding of the ship functions and mapping each function to the 
appropriate physical form on the ship. This analysis provides the fundamental 
understanding of the ship class as a system of systems. Further, it supports interpretation 
of each system block of a reliability block diagram, which is covered in Chapter IX. 
To understand what a MCM-1 class ship is designed to do and to relate the 
material requirements to include parts harvesting operations prior to one of the ship’s 
being dismantled, it is important to understand the ship’s functions. The MCM-1 class 
ship functional decomposition is shown in Figure 18. 














The MCM-1 class ship top-level functions are “maintain positive buoyancy,” 
“move ship,” “support crew,” “deploy mine countermeasures,” and “provide 
communication.” These functions must be fulfilled for the ship to perform its mission. 
Each function is characterized by performance(s) that must be achieved, and in turn, each 
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performance may have several quality requirements. For the purpose of this thesis, most 
performance and quality measures are assumed to be defined and met for actual 
implementation. A further review of each top-level lower level functions follows. 
The function “maintain positive buoyancy” is the single most fundamental 
function of any ship, as it ensures that the vessel floats on the water. Two sub-functions 
“maintain positive buoyancy.” The first is to “ballast ship.” This function requires the 
ship to be loaded out in accordance with the ship’s ballast plan to meet ship design 
stability requirements. The second sub-function is “maintain watertight integrity,” which 
prevents uncontrolled flooding of the ship. 
The top-level function “move ship” is the ship’s capability to have controlled 
movement through the water. “Move ship” consists of five sub-functions. The first is 
“propel ship,” which provides forward and aft direction movement through the water. 
The second is “steer ship,” which enables movement in the port and starboard directions. 
The third is “navigate ship,” which is ascertaining the ship’s position and 
planning/following a specific course. The fourth sub-function is “provide electrical 
power,” which enables all shipboard systems to operate. The fifth is “provide auxiliaries 
support,” which provide various operations, such as compressed air, cooling, sewage 
processing, and oil pollution prevention.  
The top-level function “support crew” is the actions required to support sailors 
that live onboard and operate the ship. The “support crew” top-level function consists of 
five sub-functions. The first is “provide food service spaces.” This function allows for 
meal preparation onboard the ship. The second is “provide living spaces,” which includes 
the spaces where sailors sleep, store personal items, and relax. The third is “provide 
sanitary spaces,” which includes restroom and bathing facilities. The fourth is “provide 
messing spaces” that allocates an area for sailors to consume meals. The fifth is “provide 
damage control.” This function facilitates actions to minimize the impact of accidents or 
errors. 
The top-level function “deploy mine countermeasures” includes protecting the 
ship from setting off mines and actions that clear mines from a given body of water. The 
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“deploy mine countermeasures” top-level function consists of two sub-functions. The 
first is “deploy passive mine countermeasures,” which ensures the ship is magnetically 
“silent” to prevent setting off magnetically actuated mines as it moves through the water. 
The second is “deploy active mine countermeasures,” which entails the active clearing of 
mines from a marine waterway based on intelligence and operational orders. The “deploy 
active mine countermeasures” sub-function can be further divided into two mid-level 
functions. The first is “conduct minehunting operations,” which outlines the process to 
find mines actively in a marine waterway. The second is “conduct minesweeping 
operations,” which utilizes various towing configurations to clear actuate or cut moored 
mines loose from the seafloor.  
Both the “conduct mine-hunting operations” and “conduct minesweeping 
operations” mid-level functions can further be broken down into low-level functions. The 
“conduct mine-hunting operations” mid-level function consists of four low-level 
functions. The first is “detect mines,” which is the search for foreign objects in the water. 
The second is “identify mines,” which determines if a contact is a mine-like object. The 
third is “classify mines,” which includes determining the method of mine actuation and 
position in the water. The fourth is “neutralize mine,” which can be accomplished by 
defusing or actuating it under controlled conditions.  
The “conduct minesweeping operations” mid-level function can be further 
divided into three low-level functions. The first is “detach moored mines,” which releases 
moored mines from their tether to the ocean floor. The second is “actuate/explode 
magnetic influence mines,” which is accomplished by generating a magnetic field to 
trigger the mine explosion. The third is “actuate/explode acoustic influence mines,” 
which entails generating appropriate noise to trigger acoustic mines.  
The top-level function “provide communication” allows the ship to both send and 
receive communication signals. The “provide communication” top-level function can be 
broken down into two sub-functions. The first is “provide internal communications,” 
which allows for communication within the ship. The second is “provide external 
communications,” which allows for communication with external entities to the ship. 
Both these sub-functions can be further decomposed to mid-level functions. 
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The “provide internal communications” sub-function consists of two low-level 
functions. The first is “provide internal secure internet protocol router (SIPR) 
communications,” which allows for secure communications within the ship. The second 
is “provide internal non-secure internet protocol router (NIPR) communications,” which 
facilitates non-secure communications within the ship.  
The “provide external communications” sub-function consists of two low-level 
functions. The first is “transmit external communications,” which allows communication 
signals to be transmitted from the ship to external entities. The second is “receive 
external communications,” which allows the ship to receive communication signals from 
external entities. Both these low-level functions can further be decomposed into bottom-
level functions. 
The “transmit external communications” low-level function consists of two 
bottom-level functions. The first is “transmit NIPR communications,” which allows for 
sending non-secure communication signals from the ship to external entities. The second 
is “transmit SIPR communications.” This function allows for secure communication 
signals to be transmitted from the ship to external entities. 
The “receive external communications” low-level function consists of two 
bottom-level functions. The first is “receive external NIPR communications,” which 
allows the ship to receive non-secure communication signals from external entities. The 
second is “receive external SIPR communications,” which allows the ship to receive 
secure communication signals from external entities.  
The mapping of functions to the appropriate form onboard the ship that performs 






Table 6.   MCM-1 Class Ship Function to Form Mapping 
Function Form
1.1 Maintain positive buoyancy N/A
1.1.1 Ballast ship oil tanks, water tanks, fuel tanks
1.1.2 Maintain WT integrity ship structure/hull
1.2 Move ship N/A
1.2.1 Propel ship 
main propulsion diesel engines (MPDE) (4), port and 
Stbd propulsion shafts (1 each), P/S controllable pitch 
propeller (CPP) (1 each), 2 electric propulsion motors 
(LLPMs), P/S main reduction gear, flexible couplings, 
MPDE clutch, integrated shipboard control system 
(ISCS)/integrated control assessment system (ICAS)
1.2.2 Steer ship steering system, rudder, bow thruster 
1.2.3. Navigate ship PINS, electronic navigation systems 
1.2.4 Provide electrical power 
SSDGs, distribution switchboards, DC distribution, 60 
Hz system, 400 Hz system, static frequency converters 
1.2.5 Provide auxiliaries support 
Lube oil system, fuel oil system, air conditioning (AC) 
system, auxiliary seawater (SW), chill water (CW) 
system, start air system, medium pressure air 
compressors (MPACs), oil pollution control system, 
potable water (PW) system, reverse osmosis (RO) units 
1.3 Support crew N/A
1.3.1 Provide food services 
refrigeration system, griddle, PW system, collection 
holding & transfer (CHT) system 
1.3.2 Provide living spaces distributed lighting system, AC system, CW system, RO system, CHT system
1.3.3 Provide sanitary spaces CHT system, heads, commodes, urinals, showers, 
1.3.4 Provide messing spaces AC system, CHT system
1.3.5 Provide damage control fire main system, AFFF system, main/secondary drainage system, 
1.4 Deploy mine countermeasures N/A
1.4.1 Deploy active defense MCM N/A
1.4.1.1 Conduct minehunting 
operations 
global command and control system (GCCS), precise 
integrated navigation system (PINS), MIW (mine 
warfare) and Environmental decision aids library 
(MEDAL), battle space profiler (BSP), expendable 
bathythermograph (XBT)
1.4.1.1.1 Detect mines SQQ-32, detect console
1.4.1.1.2 Classify mines SQQ-32, classify console
1.4.1.1.3 Identify mines 
SLQ-48 (UCHS, 48 console) or SLQ-60 (identification 





Table 6 (cont’d). MCM-1 Class Ship Function to Form Mapping 
Function Form
1.4.1.1.4 Neutralize mines 
SLQ-48 (UCHS, 48 console, WQC-2, which is a 
triggering device, mission package - the bomblet) or 
SLQ-60 (combat round), vehicle handling system 
Crane), SQQ-32
1.4.1.2 Conduct minesweeping 
operations 
GCCS, PINS, MEDAL 
1.4.1.2.1 Detach moored mines AN/SLQ-38 (float pennants), minesweep winch, stern cranes 
1.4.1.2.2 Actuate/explode magnetic 
influence mines 
AN/SLQ-37, Magnetic sweep cable (nomenclature 
- SLQ-37), cable reel, MMGTG, minesweep 
control switchboard, solid state pulse generators 
1.4.1.2.3 Actuate/explode acoustic 
influence mines 
acoustic power tow cable, TB-35/36, stern cranes 
1.4.2 Deploy passive defense MCM degaussing system, shaft grounding system 
1.5 Provide communications N/A 
1.5.1 Provide internal 
communications 
N/A 
1.5.1.1 Provide internal SIPR 
communications 
SIPR network 
1.5.1.2 Provide internal NIPR 
communications 
NIPR network, 1MC, 21MC, 2JV, internal phone 
system 
1.5.2 Provide external 
communications 
N/A 
1.5.2.1 Transmit external 
communications 
N/A 
1.5.2.1.1 Transmit external NIPR 
communications 
HF—tactical variant switch, HF transceiver 
(AN/URC-143), HF receive antennae, HF transmit 
antennae (AS-2537); VHF—tactical variant 
switch, VHF transceiver, VHF antennae; UHF 
(LoS)—tactical variant switch, WSC-3 transceiver, 
UHF LoS antennae; UHF (Sat)—tactical variant 
switch, Mini DAMA (MD-1329), UHF Sat 
antennae (OE-82); SHF (CBSP)—ISNS, GCCS, 










Table 6 (cont’d). MCM-1 Class Ship Function to Form Mapping 
Function Form
1.5.2.1.2 Transmit external SIPR 
communications 
HF—tactical variant switch, HF transceiver 
(AN/URC-143), HF receive antennae, HF transmit 
antennae (AS-2537); VHF—tactical variant 
switch, VHF transceiver, VHF antennae; UHF 
(LoS) - Tactical Variant Switch, WSC-3 
transceiver, UHF LoS antennae; UHF (Sat) —
tactical variant switch, Mini DAMA (MD-1329), 
UHF Sat antennae (OE-82); SHF (CBSP)—ISNS, 
GCCS, ADNS, CBSP, AN/USC-69(V) SSV (small 
ship variant); cryptographic device 
1.5.2.2 Receive external 
communications 
N/A 
1.5.2.2.1 Receive external SIPR 
communications 
HF—tactical variant switch, HF transceiver 
(AN/URC-143), HF receive antennae, HF transmit 
antennae (AS-2537); VHF—tactical variant 
switch, VHF transceiver, VHF antennae; UHF 
(LoS)—tactical variant switch, WSC-3 transceiver, 
UHF LoS antennae; UHF (Sat)—tactical variant 
switch, Mini DAMA (MD-1329), UHF Sat 
antennae (OE-82); SHF (CBSP)—ISNS, GCCS, 
ADNS, CBSP, AN/USC-69(V) SSV (small ship 
variant); cryptographic device 
1.5.2.2.2 Receive external NIPR 
communications 
HF—tactical variant switch, HF transceiver 
(AN/URC-143), HF receive antennae, HF transmit 
antennae (AS-2537); VHF—tactical variant 
switch, VHF transceiver, VHF antennae; UHF 
(LoS) —tactical variant switch, WSC-3 
transceiver, UHF LoS antennae; UHF (Sat) —
tactical variant switch, Mini DAMA (MD-1329), 
UHF Sat antennae (OE-82); SHF (CBSP) —ISNS, 




IX. PROCESS DEFINITION 
Now that the importance, the stakeholders, and the functions of parts harvesting 
are delineated, a process for the logical and optimal steps can be defined. This process is 
the form that maps to the functions of parts harvesting as defined in section III.C. It is 
thus assumed that a one-for-one direct relationship exists between the top-level functions 
and the steps in the process, which are illustrated in Figure 19.  
Figure 19.  Parts Harvesting Process 
 
A. KICKOFF AND DETERMINE HARVESTING NEEDS 
SEA21 will be responsible for the parts harvesting project from start to finish. 
Specifically, the PMS443 surface ship sustainment code shall identify a harvesting 
manager to lead an IPT that facilitates all requirements of the harvesting process. The IPT 
shall be established via naval message outlining the opportunity to harvest parts off a 
decommissioning asset and request appropriate stakeholder support. The message shall 
outline the ship(s) to be harvested, notional timeline of harvesting operations, time and 
date of kick-off meeting, expected frequency of recurring meetings, deliverable 
(prioritized listing of parts to be harvested), and request acknowledgement of the message 
by sending an e-mail to the message point of contact with each organization’s assigned 
representative for the IPT. The harvesting manager shall interface with SEA21I (Navy 
 82
inactive ships) regarding all requirements and timelines for dismantling, to include the 
latest date the ship can be harvested until it must be moved to the scrapping facility. 
SEA21 shall develop a single spreadsheet that will facilitate documentation of 
parts harvesting needs. Minimum spreadsheet recommendations are the following: 
 Three separate worksheets for combat systems (CS), hull mechanical & 
electrical (HM&E), and command, control, communications, computers, 
& intelligence (C4I) components identification. 
 Column headings for each worksheet: 
 Equipment functional description (EFD) 
 Location 
 Allowance parts list (APL) 
 Quantity (onboard) 
 Priority 1–3, where 1 is the highest priority (lack of part is ship 
mission limiting and insufficient spares exist), 2 is medium priority 
(harvesting and refurbishment is cheaper than purchasing new 
components or insufficient spares exist, but the system is not ship 
mission critical), and 3 is the lowest priority (e.g., components 
needed for training, testing) 
 Shipping address for harvesting components 
 Equipment to be harvested point of contact (POC) 
 Notes  
Approximately 30 months prior to the execution of harvesting operations (must have 
sufficient time to identify harvesting requirements to estimate resources required for 
POM issue paper), SEA21 shall facilitate setting up the kick-off meeting. The kick-off 
meeting needs to communicate clearly the harvesting operation intentions to include 
required participation by all applicable PARMs, TWHs, ISEAs, SMEs, and fleet for parts 
harvesting submissions. The expectation should be to have all parts harvesting 
submissions within 90 days. PARMs, with the assistance of other stakeholders, shall 
provide inputs to the parts harvesting needs list in support of the harvesting operation 
IPT.  
Determining harvesting needs can further be divided into the steps outlined in 
Figure 20. Figure 20 proposes a data-driven model that utilizes reliability block diagrams, 
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fault tree analysis, evaluation of service life sparing requirements, and systems 
optimization techniques via a linear program that minimizes cost. 




Ideally, the PARM would utilize this model to determine what parts should be 
harvested from a decommissioning asset. This model should be the road map in 
determining the appropriate components to harvest, overhaul, and warehouse to support 
system life cycle sparing requirements. This model can be utilized to support analysis 
upon official declaration that an in-service MCM (or any other ship class) will be slated 
for decommissioning and dismantling.  
In a general sense, the top section of this model would require the PARM to 
commence with building a RBD for the system they are responsible for to determine 
system subcomponents that are limiting system reliability. The next step requires a fault 
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tree analysis (FTA) be performed to each system subcomponent adversely affecting 
system reliability to help to determine the critical parts of the system.  
PARMs would then use the lower section of the model in Figure 20 to determine 
the sparing requirement of the critical components, the quantity currently available in 
stock, and the number needed (if any) to meet life cycle demand. If the number required 
to meet life cycle demand is greater than zero, then the PARM would identify the number 
available to purchase and associated costs and the number available to harvest from a 
decommissioning asset with estimated costs. These values would be inputs to a linear 
program that would determine minimum cost to meet the critical part life cycle demand.  
1. System Reliability Block Diagrams 
To understand better what components should be harvested from a MCM prior to 
dismantling, it is critical to look at all factors holistically. For example, it would be 
beneficial to have a complete reliability block diagram for the remaining in-service ships. 
NSWC Corona was provided some funding to start this effort for MCMs in 2013. 
Unfortunately, funding has not been available to continue the effort, but Figure 21 is 












Figure 21.  MCM-1 Avenger Class RBD 
 
From: NSWC Corona RA16. 2013. MCM—Platform Reliability Diagram. 1st ed. 
Corona, CA: Naval Surface Warfare Center, 4. 
Calculating the individual Ao for each sub-system will provide a platform level 
operational availability. Any in-service ship not meeting the platform 75% Ao objective 
outlined in Chapter III, Section F requires further analysis as to which sub-systems are 
impacting readiness. These areas should be scrutinized further and are potential good 
parts harvesting candidates.  
Focusing in on just a single portion of the auxiliaries section results in something 
similar to Figure 22. 
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Figure 22.  MCM Auxiliaries Section of RBD 
 
From: NSWC Corona RA16. 2013. MCM—Platform Reliability Diagram. 1st ed. 
Corona, CA: Naval Surface Warfare Center, 4. 
Breaking the platform level RBD down into manageable subsections for review 
will facilitate calculating warfare area reliability. To calculate the reliability of the entire 
platform, warfare area, or even just a small subset of the systems, the following 
calculations would be used. 
Reliability of components in series: 
R=R1 x R2 x…Rn 
R = Total Reliability 
Rn = Reliability of part n 
 
Reliability of parallel components: 
R=1-(1-R1)(1-R2)…(1-Rn)  
R = Total Reliability 
Rn = Reliability of part n 
 
To solve the reliability of the components in Figure 22, calculate the reliability of the 
parallel components (AC plants, refrigeration plants, and RO plants). Once the reliability 
calculations are completed for the parallel components, everything would be in series as 
per Figure 23.  
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Figure 23.  Series View of Figure 22 
 
 
This reliability analysis will demonstrate if the components comprising the systems are 
meeting standards. If not, the components not meeting standards could be a good area to 
review for possible parts harvesting on the decommissioning asset.  
Operational availability of components in series can be calculated with: 
Ao = Ao1 x Ao2….Aon, and 
Ao = Total operational availability 
Aon = Operational availability of part n 
 
operational availability of components in parallel: 
Ao = 1-(1-Ao1)(1-Ao2)…(1-(Aon) 
Ao = Total operational availability 
Aon = Operational availability of part n 
It is important to understand, as the Ao objective is the top-level requirement to be meet. 
While this objective might not seem too aggressive at first glance, it is worth noting that 
40 individual systems (counting the systems in parallel only one time each) are outlined 
in Figure 5. To meet the 75% platform Ao, each system Ao must average 0.99283375, 
which was calculated using the following formula.  
Aoplatform = .75  
.75 = Aosys avg^40 
Aosys avg = 0.99283375 
Aoplatform = Operational availability of the platform 
Aosys avg = System average operational availability 
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Therefore, any system with an Ao lower than 0.99283375 should be further 
reviewed by the system PARM and considered a potential parts harvesting candidate.  
2. Fault Tree Analysis 
Any area of concern from Figures 21, 22, or 23 can be further scrutinized via 
FTA. If assuming that the AC plants are not meeting reliability or Ao requirements as 
outlined previously, a FTA can be performed to determine the components with the 
highest failure rate. A FTA for the AC plants is shown in Figure 24. 
Figure 24.  AC System Fault Tree Analysis 
 
 
The fault tree states that both AC Plant 1 and 2 must both fail for the system to 
fail. Additionally, each AC plant has a compressor, condenser, evaporator, and thermal 
expansion valve (TXV). If any of these components fail, then that individual AC Plant 
fails. To determine the failure rate of the above systems, the MTBF figures would be 
required. Once the MTBF figures are known, the failure rate    can be easily calculated 
via the equation: 
1
MTBF  . 
With the failure rate of the components known, the following equations would apply for 
system failure. 
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Quantitative OR Gate: 
Fsys = 1-(1-F1)(1-F2)..(1-Fn)   
FAC Plant1 = 1-(1-Fcompressor)(1-Fcondenser)(1-Fevap)(1-FTXV) 
FAC Plant2 = 1-(1-Fcompressor)(1-Fcondenser)(1-Fevap)(1-FTXV) 
Quantitative AND Gate: 
Fsys = F1 x F2 x…Fn   
FAC Sys = FAC Plant1 x FAC Plant2 
Fsys = Failure rate of the system 
Fn = Failure rate of part n 
3. Determine Critical Parts 
While the system failure equations and principles are important, the components 
having the highest failure rates should be scrutinized as potential candidates for parts 
harvesting. Additionally, analysis should also include any critical component(s) in the 
FTA that have long lead times. This thesis argues anything greater than 90 days would be 
considered a long lead time. If the critical component has a long lead time or is no longer 
available for procurement (obsolete), and will most likely fail prior to the ship 
decommissioning, then it also is an excellent candidate for parts harvesting. Increasing 
the quantity of available critical repair parts can reduce MLDT and increase system Ao. 
One of the assumptions made in this paper is that the Navy supply system cannot actively 
keep up with demand. In the event the Navy supply system can in fact keep up with 
repair part demand, then the component might not be ideal for parts harvesting. The 
optimization model outlined in Section IX.A.g. will calculate if it is still more cost 
effective to harvest a given component or not.  
4. Determine the Sparing Requirement 
Spare parts are required to conduct both corrective and preventative maintenance. 
If the PARM does not know the sparing requirement for the critical parts, then the 









     
   
“P = probability of having a spare of a particular item available when required 
S = number of spare parts carried in stock 
R = composite reliability (probability of survival); K tR e    
K = number of parts used of a particular type 
ln R = natural logarithm of R” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 518) 
failure rate .number of failures
total operating hours
       
“In determining spare-part quantities, one should consider the level of protection 
desired (safety factor). The protection level is the P value in the above equation. This is 
the probability of having a spare available when required. The higher the protection level, 
the greater the quantity of spares required” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 518). 
A more practical method of determining the number of spare parts required would 
be to use Appendix A, the Sparing Requirement Quantity Determination Model. The 
objective of this model is to establish the sparing requirement of a unique critical part. 
Users of this model will need to input data to facilitate the summation of all K t  values 
where K = the number of parts used of a particular type,   is the failure rate of the part, 
and t is operating time left in the system service life. For example, assume 10 MCM-1 
class ships remain in-service and a given system (compressed air) has two pieces of 
identical equipment (MPAC) that have four identical and unique parts per compressor. 
Therefore, solve for K using the equation: 
K = M x P 
K = 2 x 4 
 K = 8 unique parts per ship 
 K = the number of parts used of a particular type per ship 
M = number of MPACs per ship 
 P = Number of parts used of a particular type per MPAC 
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Further, the t value (operating time left in system service life) would be based on each 
vessel’s decommissioning date or system service life schedule if the system and/or 
equipment will be replaced prior to ship decommissioning. Solve for t using the equation: 
t for each ship= # of days remaining in service life x operating hours/day 
Therefore, t will have 10 unique values (one per MCM remaining in service). Most likely 
for this example,   will remain constant for all 10 entries. To summarize the first 
example, a total of 10 entries would appear in the Data_Entry worksheet of Appendix A 
where K would = 8,   would be the same for each entry in #failures/hr, and t would be 
the operating time left in the system service life for each ship.  
A second example is simply to keep adding to the above example. Assume that 
the LCS has the exact same MPAC, with the same critical part, which needs to be 
included in the sparing requirement analysis. In this case, simply find the new value for 
each variable (K, , and t). The total number of entries will be then 10 MCM entries plus 
the number of LCS entries. All these values will be input into the Data_Entry worksheet.  
Once the data entry has been completed in the Data_Entry worksheet of Appendix 
A, users simply need to click on the Sparing_Requirement worksheet. Go to column G in 
the worksheet and find “Probability of having a particular spare when required.” Find the 
closest value to the desired probability value and read the corresponding number of 
spares required from Column F. If the desired probability is between two numbers in the 
worksheet, round up to the larger number to find the required spares.  
5. Determine Current Stock and Number Needed 
Once the sparing requirement is understood, the PARM would conduct a stock 
check of the critical parts available as per Figure 20 to determine the total number of 
parts needed as per the equation: 
.Sparing requirement current stock Total critical parts needed   
If any instance of the total critical parts needed is > 0, then proceed to the next step in the 
Figure 20 flow diagram.  
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6. Identify Number Available to Purchase and Number Available to 
Harvest and Costs 
Now that the total number of critical parts needed is understood, the PARM will 
need to identify the number available to purchase, and associated costs, as well as the 
number available to harvest and estimated costs. The associated costs for each should 
include any contract fees, labor, repair costs, shipment, and storage costs for the 
estimated shelf life of the part. All these values will be used as input parameters for the 
optimization model in the next step.  
7. Perform Optimization Utilizing Model 
At this point, the information gathered through the previous steps will be input 
into an optimization model to determine the optimal number of parts to procure or harvest 
given the number available of each.  
The objective of the model is to minimize cost as calculated based on the quantity 
of a part needed, the quantity of that part available for purchase or harvest, the expected 
repairable rate of harvested parts and cost of repair, the cost to harvest or purchase each, 
and the cost to store each. The following variables represent these values.  
Input Variables:  
HPCi = Estimated cost to harvest each instance of part i 
RCi = Estimated cost to repair harvest part i 
PPCi = Cost to procure one unit of part i 
%REPi = % of harvested part i estimated to be repairable 
DHCi = Disposal cost of non-repairable harvested parts i 
HWHCi = Estimated cost to warehouse for life of harvested part i 
PWHCi = Estimated cost to warehouse for life of procured part i 
Har_Availi = Total # of part i available for harvesting 
Mark_Availi = Total # of part i available on the market for purchase 
#Neededi = Total # of part i needed for system service life 
Min Cost = (HPCi)(Hi) + (RCi)(Hi)( %REPi) + (PPCi)(Pi) + (HWHCi)(Hi)( 
%REPi) + (Hi)(1-%REPi)(DCHi) + (PWHCi)(Pi) 
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These values can also be read as follows, since the objective is to minimize cost: 
where cost is equal to the cost to harvest part i multiplied by the number of parts i 
harvested, plus the cost to repair harvested parts i multiplied by the number of parts i 
harvested and the percent of harvested parts i that are repairable, plus the cost of parts i 
purchased multiplied by the number of parts i purchased, plus the cost to store harvested 
parts i multiplied by the number of parts i harvested and the percent of harvested parts i 
that are repairable, plus the number of parts i harvested multiplied by the number of 
unrepairable parts i and the cost of disposal of those parts i, plus the cost to store 
purchased parts i multiplied by the number of parts i purchased.  
This objective function is subject to the constraints of the following: 
 The number of parts harvested must be less than or equal to the number 
available (Hi <= Har_Availi). 
 The number of parts purchased must be less than or equal to the number 
available (Pi <= Mark_Availi). 
 The number of parts purchased plus the number of parts harvested 
(factoring in the repairable rate) must be equal to the number needed (Hi x 
%REPi + Pi <= #Neededi). 
 All variables must be greater than or equal to zero (All variables >=0). 
 The number of parts harvested and the number of parts purchased must be 
integers (Hi, Pi are integer values). 
8. Iterate/Repeat Process as Necessary 
The above processes outlined in Sections 4–8 are repeated for each critical part. 
At the conclusion, an exhaustive list will exist of the ship’s critical components, the 
sparing requirements, the available stock, and a decision to procure or harvest any parts 
needed to close the delta between sparing need and spares available.  
9. Ship Checks (if Required) 
All applicable stakeholders are encouraged to visit the decommissioning ship(s) 
as resources permit to assess the condition of possible parts harvesting candidates. This 
assessment will aid in the harvesting spreadsheet development and will prevent 
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unnecessary expenditure of resources where a visual assessment of the equipment is 
sufficient to know whether it should be harvested.  
10. Consolidate Inputs 
The PMS 443 harvesting manager is responsible for consolidating all inputs by 
PARMs and other stakeholders into a single spreadsheet. The harvesting manager shall 
chair a meeting to review the consolidated listing with the IPT to verify consolidated list 
accuracy, harvesting priority, confirm candidate component shipping addresses, and 
entity to harvest components. Further, the harvesting manager shall work with SEA21I to 
identify all components that must be harvested during the dismantling phase, as opposed 
to during the harvesting availability. This identification will facilitate developing the 
dismantling scope of work to include items that can only be removed during the 
scrapping operation. 
B. PLAN EQUIPMENT REMOVAL 
1. Establish Harvesting Operation Availability 
Once the parts harvesting candidate list has been developed, the planning of 
equipment removal begins. The harvesting manager shall work with the appropriate 
TYCOM (Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific for MCM-1 class ships) to schedule 
a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) availability in support of parts harvesting operations 
no later than 26 months prior to ship decommissioning. The harvesting manager shall 
notify the TYCOM if the harvesting operations will require the ship(s) to be dry-docked 
or not. The RMC shall enter the availability into the Navy maintenance database (NMD) 
at the TYCOM direction.  
2. Plan Ships Force Equipment Removal 
SF personnel will usually wish to remove some of the smaller components from 
the ship to be decommissioned that would be beneficial to the rest of the fleet. 
MCMRON3 shall be the SF advocate and interface with the PMS 443 harvesting 
manager to coordinate equipment removal. MCMRON3 shall manage SF equipment 
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removal operations to ensure appropriate procedures are followed and custody 
documentation is filled out accordingly.  
3. Plan Government Entity Equipment Removal 
Some equipment will be best removed directly by government entities, and could 
include ISEAs, RMC, or program office assigned personnel. These efforts must be 
coordinated and communicated by each entity with the harvesting manager no later than 
60 days prior to commencement of the parts harvesting availability. The harvesting 
manager shall ensure all unique efforts are de-conflicted.  
4. Plan Industrial Activity Equipment Removal 
The TYCOM shall direct one of the MCM-1 class ship PEs to create a job in the 
validation, screening, and brokering (VSB) program directing the contractor to provide 
labor, material, and equipment required to harvest, package, and ship the equipment 
designated for IA removal in the consolidated parts harvesting spreadsheet provided by 
the PMS 443 harvesting manager. This job shall be screened to the appropriate parts 
harvesting availability. The RMC assigned project manager will push the job over to the 
3PP activity for work specification development. 
The 3PP activity will be responsible for developing the work specifications in 
support of the harvesting operations and providing project estimates. The work 
specifications shall include the removal of equipment, packaging (as required) and 
shipment. Specs should require contractor the project manager to coordinate all material 
shipment with the harvesting manager to ensure the warehouse would be manned 
accordingly to receive shipments.  
NOTE: Some of the equipment to be harvested might require onsite SME 
oversight. This SME will need to be identified and funding secured to support the 
availability. 
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C. FUND PARTS HARVESTING 
1. Submit POM Issue Paper 
Following the planning activities, PMS 443 shall develop and submit the POM 
issue paper in accordance with the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 
(PPBE) processes to ensure funding will be available during the parts’ harvesting year of 
execution. This thesis argues that PMS443 should provide POMs for all harvested 
equipment removals to mitigate challenges where stakeholders would submit their own 
POMs and then only a portion of the harvesting is funded. Further, the execution of the 
funding of temporary services (security, warehousing, crane support) that is a shared cost 
across all stakeholders during an availability and any growth or new work funding is 
significantly simplified. The programmatic estimate for the POM submission can be 
based on the planning estimate provided by the 3PP.  
2. Establish Contract Vehicle 
The harvesting manager shall also work with the appropriate RMC to ensure a 
contract will be developed (if required) and in place to support harvesting operations. The 
RMC shall develop a contract to support harvesting operations. The technical work 
specifications to support the Request for Proposal (RFP) shall come from the 3PP.  
3. Fund Planning/Execution 
PMS 443 shall transfer funds to the appropriate RMC when required to support 
harvesting execution to include both contract award funding and any growth or new work 
during the availability. The planning costs will be covered by the MCM-1 class 3PP 
contract, as per the assumptions outlined in the concept of operations section of this 
paper. 
D. REMOVE EQUIPMENT FROM DECOM SHIP 
Now that the desired parts and quantities for harvesting have been identified, the 
operation has been planned, and funds are in place, the next step in the high-level process 
is to execute harvesting. This procedure assumes that the RMC will chair a WPER in 
according with JFMM policy. 
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1. SF Remove Equipment 
SF shall execute the removal of any small components based on the plan that 
MCMRON3 coordinated with ship crews. MCMRON3 shall ensure all equipment 
removed is in accordance with the agreed upon plan with the harvesting manager and that 
all equipment removed has appropriate custody documentation. It is recommended that 
SF accomplish equipment removals just prior to the harvesting availability if the schedule 
permits, as it helps to de-conflict with industrial activity or government entity harvesting 
efforts. 
2. GE Remove Equipment  
Government entities shall coordinate all equipment removals with the RMC 
project manager prior to commencing work. The RMC project manager will line up all 
required onsite support (crane, fork truck, packaging) if required. Government entities 
will follow all appropriate custody documentation requirements for equipment removed 
and verify equipment removed with the RMC project manager and PMS 443 harvesting 
manager upon completion.  
3. IA Remove Equipment 
The RMC project manager and ship building specialists (SBSs) shall be onsite for 
the duration of the harvesting availability project at the contractor’s facility and manage 
the availability in accordance with the JFMM to ensure all work is performed as per the 
requirements of the availability work package. The entity harvesting equipment is also 
responsible for identifying, staging, and packaging the components in support of shipping 
as they are removed from the ship. Additionally, the contractor must keep an accurate 
inventory of the harvested material, as some changes to the original work scope are 
likely.  
E. STORE EQUIPMENT (WAREHOUSING) 
All the components removed during parts harvesting operations must be stored in 
a laydown or warehouse accordingly. During the availability, the availability work 
package will outline the storing requirements for all equipment removed to be staged for 
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shipment. Each stakeholder requesting equipment to be harvested shall be responsible for 
storing equipment upon the completion of the parts harvesting availability and shipment 
to the respective facility.  
F. SHIP EQUIPMENT 
Once all material is harvested from the ship, it is packaged and shipped to the 
appropriate warehouse or repair facility. The requirements for equipment shipping will be 
outlined in the availability work package. The harvesting manager shall interface with the 
RMC project manager and each stakeholder who will be having harvested material 
shipped following the parts harvesting availability to ensure the destination warehouse 
will be appropriately manned and prepared to receive the components (fork truck 
operators, crane operators).  
G. DOCUMENT IN ERP 
All equipment removed from the harvesting operation must be documented into 
the Navy ERP database in accordance with applicable Operating Materials and Supplies 
(OM&S) procedures. Each PARM or stakeholder receiving material shall document their 
respective material in the ERP program.  
H. REFURBISH HARVESTED EQUIPMENT 
Once all harvested equipment has been shipped to its final destination, it needs to 
be assessed to determine if it will be overhauled and put back into RFI status, and 
stripped further for specific component repair/reuse, or discarded. Depending on the 
organization’s available resources, the refurbishment process will commence once 
resources are available and fleet need for the component in question. The RMC, 
industrial activity, and government repair depot are the three major entities that can 
refurbish material. All material placed into RFI status shall be documented accordingly in 
the Navy supply databases.  
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I. DISPOSE UNNECESSARY COMPONENTS 
Some of the harvested components or individual component pieces will be slated 
for disposal following assessment. This material shall be disposed of in accordance with 
all applicable Navy disposal procedures.  
J. WRAP-UP AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Wrap-Up 
To wrap up the parts harvesting operation, the harvesting manager will conduct a 
closeout meeting with the IPT stakeholders within 90 days of the harvest availability end 
date. The meeting purpose is to provide a final consolidated listing of all parts harvested 
and to solicit feedback to improve the process. PMS 443 shall make any appropriate 
procedure updates, which will be an iterative process until the MCM-1 class ships are all 
dismantled. 
2. Measures of Effectiveness 
To determine how effective the parts harvesting process was in supporting the 
MCM-1 class ships, certain data shall be collected. This thesis argues that three major 
metrics should be tracked and analyzed to determine the parts harvesting effectiveness. 
The first is usage rate over time, which simply tracks the harvested parts used to make 
system repairs. This metric shall be tracked by each PARM. The usage rate over time 
metric is fundamental to improving the next two metrics, cost avoidance, and system 
operational availability. The cost avoidance metric calculates the costs avoided due to the 
availability of the harvested component. The cost avoidance equation proposed to be used 
is: 
CAi= PPCi – (AHPCi + ARCi + AHWHCi 
CAi = Cost Avoidance for part i 
PPCi = Cost to procure one unit of part i 
AHPCi = Actual cost to harvest each instance of part i 
ARCi = Actual cost to repair each instance of part i 
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AHWHCi = Actual cost to warehouse harvested part i. 
The cost avoidance metric shall also be tracked by the appropriate PARM. 
The final measure of effectiveness metric is system operational availability. As 
stated in section III.F. of this thesis, the Ao equation is: 
Ao = MTBF / (MTBF + MTTR + MLDT). 
Ao = Operational Availability 
MTBF = Mean time between failure 
MTTR = Mean time to repair 
MLDT = Mean logistics downtime 
NSWC Corona shall track the system Ao metric. The parts harvesting manager shall poll 
the appropriate PARMs and NSWC Corona every 12 months to consolidate the measures 
of effectiveness and share them with the original IPT. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
A. HARVESTING PARTS USING A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
PRINCIPLE-BASED PROCESS IS WORTHWHILE 
This thesis began by outlining the history, threat, and importance of MIW. These 
three topics are the foundation as to why a parts harvesting process to help sustain the 
MCM-1 class ships is critical to protecting the war fighter, Navy resources and assets, 
U.S. allies, and this country’s national security. MIW has proven to be a commonly used 
weapon by U.S. adversaries, has caused the most damage to U.S. Navy surface ships 
since WWII, and can result in significant negative impacts from economic upheaval, sea-
lane restrictions, and even loss of life. Sea mines are the weapons that wait; they are 
costly and time consuming to clear or neutralize once laid, and can shut down traffic 
through a body of water just based on the threat that one exists. The U.S. ability to project 
force by patrolling MCM-1 class ships in a given body of water is extremely valuable in 
deterring an adversary of using the sea mine weapon.  
The MCM-1 class ships’ ability to perform mine countermeasure operations is 
vital to the United States and its allies. To fulfill the mission, appropriate repair parts are 
required to ensure the ship class is operationally ready and will meet requirements 
throughout ESL. One of the means to ensure adequate repair parts are available for 
MCM-1 class ships is to harvest components from a decommissioning ship. In some 
cases, it is the only economical means to obtain mission critical repair parts required to 
support the remaining in-service MCM-1 class ships. Due to the unique low permeability 
requirements, coupled with several SPFs in the MCM-1 class ships, it is extremely 
difficult to have adequate repair parts at the ready for some of the mission critical MCM-
1 class ship systems. Several systems are so unique, such as AC compressors, that 
commercial suppliers will only agree to supply more if a lifetime order is placed all at 
once. This type of order simply is not realistic or affordable for all these parts. Without an 
effective parts harvesting strategy that can be implemented on each of the MCMs as they 
decommission, the Ao calculations will continue to decline unless exorbitant amounts of 
money are spent on the reverse-engineering of needed components. Therefore, parts 
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harvesting is essential for all MCM-1 class ships to meet their ESL and provide the U.S. 
Navy with mine countermeasure capabilities. 
To that end, this thesis proposes a procedure to harvest parts from a 
decommissioning MCM-1 class ship using a systems engineering process. Utilizing 
systems engineering principles to develop the harvesting procedure increases the 
probability that the procedure is executable and cost-effective. To aid in the process 
development, six questions were answered as follows.  
 What is parts harvesting?  
Parts harvesting or reclamation involves removing installed material from a 
decommissioning asset for re-use on in-service platforms prior to dismantling or 
scrapping operations.  
 Why is harvesting of material from MCM-1 class ships important?  
Harvesting material from decommissioning MCM-1 class ships is critical to 
ensuring adequate repair parts are available for the remaining in-service ships since some 
of these components are obsolete. Without parts harvesting, some of these components 
would have to be reverse-engineered, which is both costly and very time consuming. 
Ultimately, the lack of MCM-1 class repair parts would affect the operational availability 
of in-service MCM-1 class ships, which could lead to significant security and economic 
challenges for U.S. and allied interests.  
 Does a cost effective means exists to determine what should be harvested 
off a decommissioning ship? 
This thesis does propose a cost-effective means to harvest components off 
decommissioning MCM-1 class ships by predominantly using both Appendix A (Sparing 
Requirement Quantification Model) and Appendix B (Parts Harvesting System 
Optimization Model). Appendix A is a tool that determines the sparing requirement of a 
unique critical part by considering the quantity of a given part in use, the failure rate of 
the part, and the operating time left in the system service life. Using Appendix A will 
decrease the risk of harvesting or procuring either too many or too few unique critical 
parts. The quantity required is based on the aforementioned outlined criteria, coupled 
with a selected probability that the component will be available at a specific time. 
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Appendix B accounts for costs to either procure or to harvest and refurbish equipment, to 
include warehousing costs for either option to determine the quantity to procure and/or 
harvest while minimizing cost for each component. The model ensures the most cost-
effective route is chosen to fulfill calculated sparing requirements. Cost-effective parts 
harvesting helps control sustainment costs, while still striving to meet operational 
availability objectives for the class. 
 What systems engineering applications or principles can be applied to 
effectively harvest parts from MCM-1 class ships to sustain the remaining 
in-service ships through expected service life?  
Various systems engineering principles were utilized to develop the parts 
harvesting procedures. The first step was to identify the problem that outlined the fact 
that a parts harvesting procedure does not currently exist, which led to a stakeholder 
analysis and stakeholder needs. Other fundamental tools utilized included functional 
decomposition for holistic system understanding, mapping of functions to facilitate 
understanding the importance and integration of the ships’ systems, identification of 
system boundaries, and documenting assumptions and constraints, to name a few. All the 
systems engineering principles utilized were extremely valuable for the problem analysis 
required to develop the parts harvesting procedure. Using systems engineering principles 
confirmed the problem is worthy of solving and led to a solution that it is both executable 
and a cost-effective in reducing the risk of MCM-1 class ship readiness degradation prior 
to reaching end of service life.  
 What are the constraints to an effective parts harvesting system/process?  
Several assumptions and constraints must be acknowledged and accounted for 
when harvesting parts off decommissioning MCM-1 class ships. None is more important 
than recognizing the time to harvest parts from a decommissioning ship from the last 
operational mission to ship dismantling. This constraint is critical, as it puts a hard stop 
end date that harvesting operations must be completed by. One of the other important 
constraints is the budget allocated for the harvesting operation. If insufficient funds are 
provided, then some critical components will not be harvested prior to the ship being 
dismantled. Therefore, the opportunity will not be available again until the next ship in 
the class decommissions that will increase the risk of not having a critical component to 
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support in-service ship sustainment. It is worth re-iterating that the harvesting process 
proposed in this thesis was designed to minimize the cost for obtaining the critical 
components while striving to meet Ao objectives. Failure to remove a required 
component recommended by the process and models provided will most likely result in 
increased sustainment cost than if the part had been harvested as planned. Various other 
constraints and assumptions were mentioned in this thesis that are important for 
stakeholders to understand for efficient harvesting operations. 
 What are the measures of effectiveness?  
The measures of effectiveness needed to measure parts harvesting efficacy are 
usage rate over time, cost avoidance, and system operational availability. These three 
metrics will clearly determine if the parts harvesting efforts are achieving the desired 
result, and ultimately, facilitate MCM-1 class ships fulfilling required operational 
commitments.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends that the Surface Navy commit to sustaining the MCM-1 
class ships by implementing the parts harvesting procedure described in Chapter IX to 
reclaim required components off decommissioning assets. While the Navy has conducted 
various harvesting operations in the past few years, they have all been accomplished in an 
ad hoc fashion with varying results. The parts harvesting procedure outlined in Chapter 
IX can be implemented to support harvesting components from the next planned MCM-1 
class ship decommissioning in FY19. Based on the notional timeline provided in Chapter 
IV.H, the identification of components to harvest and estimated cost to support the POM 
process would have to commence in the second quarter of FY16. Establishing the 
harvesting operation integrated product team will be one of the first actions. Primary 





Table 7.   Parts Harvesting Operation Major Functions to Stakeholders Mapping 
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY  
Three main areas are recommended for further study. The first is to utilize the 
MCM parts harvesting procedure outlined in this thesis and modify it to facilitate a 
surface-wide Navy NAVSEA instruction to facilitate cost-effective parts harvesting 
operations that will provide the following: 
 Help sustain all Surface Navy ships by providing mission critical spare 
parts. 
 Reduce re-work trying to figure out how to go about harvesting parts due 
to a lack of written guidance. 
 Employ technical rigor that includes a feedback loop for procedure 
improvement. 
 Provide leadership confidence that infrequent harvesting operations are 
adequately planned and managed to achieve the desired outcome.  
The second area for further study is the need for the Surface Navy to utilize RBDs 
as the means for systematic evaluation of surface ships at the platform level. Utilizing 
RBDs to analyze a system of systems provides clarity on which areas/systems require 
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further analysis via FTA to determine problematic components. This analysis is critical to 
sustaining the various classes of ships and ensuring initiatives to improve readiness are 
actually working.  
The third and final area for further study is the need to investigate whether the 
MCM-1 class ships should be placed in an inactive status and remain pier-side until the 
entire class decommissions versus being dismantled immediately following 
decommissioning. If this option were deemed feasible (not currently part of any known 
Surface Navy plans), parts could be taken off the decommissioned ships as budgets and 
port industrial workload supported. This process could potentially save money when 
compared to parts harvesting operations all at once prior to dismantling. However, any 
potential savings would be countered by the costs to maintain the ships in an inactive 
status pier-side. These costs would have to be calculated to determine if any true cost 
savings could be realized. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the ability to extend the 
MCMs’ service life if need be due to any delays in LCS MIW MP, unforeseen budget 
cuts, or some other unknown event, would be much more feasible if the decommissioned 
assets were available for extensive harvesting operations or even re-activation. 
 107
XI. SUPPLEMENTAL 
A. MODEL FOR DETERMINING SPARING QUANTITY REQUIREMENTS 
The purpose of this model is to establish the sparing requirement of a unique 
critical part based on the quantity of that part in service, the anticipated failure rate, and 
the remaining service life. This is a Microsoft Excel model with three tabs. The first tab 
provides instructions to the user on how to complete the inputs and run the model. The 
Data_Entry tab is where the user will enter the known or estimated quantity of a critical 
part on the ship, expected failure rate of the part, and remaining service life of the ship. 
There is one entry for each ship. Once the data entry has been completed, users simply 
need to click on the Sparing_Requirement worksheet. Go to column G in the worksheet 
and find “Probability of having a particular spare when required.” Find the closest value 
to the desired probability value and read the corresponding number of spares required 
from Column F. If the desired probability is between two numbers in the worksheet, 
round up to the larger number to find the required spares. This can be repeated for each 
critical part on the ships. This information will then be used in the Model for Parts 
Harvesting System Optimization. Those interested in obtaining this supplemental model 
should contact the NPS Dudley Knox Library. 
B. MODEL FOR PARTS HARVESTING SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION 
The purpose of this model is to provide a decision of the quantity of a given part 
to either harvest from a decommissioning ship or purchase to help maintain the 
operational units at the lowest cost. The objective is to minimize cost as calculated based 
on the quantity of a part needed, the quantity of that part available for purchase or 
harvest, the expected repairable rate of harvested parts and cost of repair, the cost to 
harvest or purchase each, and the cost to store each. It is also a Microsoft Excel model 
with two tabs. The first tab provides instructions to the user on how to complete the 
inputs and run the model. The user will input the appropriate values on the Parts 
Harvesting Model tab and then use Solver to run the model and obtain an optimal 
solution for quantity of procuring or harvesting a given part that can be repeated for each 
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critical part on the ships. Those interested in obtaining this supplemental model should 
contact the NPS Dudley Knox Library. 
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